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Abstract: 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) advocates that expected return has a linear 
proportional relationship with beta (and subsequently volatility). As such, the higher the 
systematic risk of a security the higher the CAPM expected return. However, empirical 
results have hardly supported this view as argued as early as Black (1972). Instead, an 
anomaly has been evidenced across a multitude of developed and emerging markets, where 
portfolios constructed to have lower volatility have outperformed their higher volatility 
counterparts as found by Baker and Haugen (2012). This result has been found to exist in 
most Equity markets globally. In the South African market the studies of Khuzwayo (2011), 
Panulo (2014) and Oladele (2014) focused on establishing whether low volatility portfolios 
had outperformed market-cap weighted portfolios in the South African market. While they 
found this to be the case, it is important to understand if this is truly an anomaly or just a 
result of prevailing market conditions that have rewarded lower volatility stocks over the 
back-test period. As such, those conditions might not exist in the future and low volatility 
portfolios might then underperform. This research does not aim to show, yet again, the 
existence of this ‘anomaly’; instead the aim is to dissect if there is any theoretical backing 
for low volatility portfolios to outperform high volatility portfolios. If this can be uncovered, 
then it should help one understand if the ‘anomaly’ truly exists and also if it can be expected 
to continue into the future. 
 
Keywords: Beta, Alpha, Benchmarking, Arbitrage, Manager Compensation, Information 
Ratio, Analyst Forecasts, Analyst Growth Forecast Bias, Earnings Variability, Investor 
Overconfidence, Positive Skewness. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In international literature the low volatility anomaly is described as the empirical finding 
that low volatility stocks have outperformed high volatility stocks out-of-period (see Ang, 
Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2008), Baker, Bradley and Taliaferro (2014), Clarke, de Silva and 
Thorley (2011) among others). Baker and Haugen (2012) argue that this finding is 
remarkable given that it is persistent, comprehensive and contradicts the core of finance 
theory that risk taking can be expected to produce reward.  
Haugen and Heins (1972) produced a working paper covering the period 1926 to 1971 
addressing the shortfalls of the previous studies regarding the relationship between risk and 
realized return. In fact, Haugen and Heins (1972) found a negative relationship between risk 
and realized return in the U.S. stock and bond markets. Baker and Haugen (2012) argue that 
the fact that this finding is prevalent today and its existence can be evidenced as far back as 
the early 1900’s is evidence of the persistence of the low volatility anomaly. To test the 
comprehensiveness of the low volatility anomaly Baker and Haugen (2012) performed a 
back-test of low vs. high volatility portfolios in the largest 21 developed and largest 12 
emerging markets globally (including South Africa). They found the low volatility portfolios 
to outperform the high volatility portfolios in all of these markets at a considerably lower 
risk out-of-period.  
In the South African market Khuzwayo (2011), Panulo (2014) and Oladele (2014) 
constructed low volatility portfolios using different portfolio construction methodologies. 
While the above studies support the low volatility anomaly in the South African market, 
they were rather focused on analysing the low volatility portfolios relative to the market-cap 
weighted benchmarks and understanding the differences between the different low 
volatility portfolio construction methodologies. This thesis is materially different to the 
studies of Khuzwayo (2011), Panulo (2014) and Oladele (2014) in the following ways: 
1. In this thesis the focus will be on the low volatility portfolios relative to high volatility 
portfolios (as opposed to market-cap weighted portfolios) in the South African 
market. This will ensure that the low volatility performance metric is consistent with 
international literature. 
2. The main aim is to understand the potential causes of the low volatility anomaly by 
assessing arguments found in international literature and establishing if these 
arguments are relevant in the South African environment (see Baker and Haugen 
(2012), Hsu, Kudoh and Yamada (2013) and Baker, Bradley and Wurgler (2011) 
among others). Thus the aim will be to find empirical evidence in the South African 
market, if any, that is supportive of the causes of the low volatility anomaly as 
described in international literature. 
 
7 
 
If the potential causes of the low volatility anomaly can be uncovered in the South African 
market it should help one understand if it can be expected to continue into the future. 
2. Literature Review 
 
The CAPM advocates that expected return has a linear proportional relationship with beta 
(and subsequently volatility). As such, the higher the systematic risk of a security the higher 
the CAPM expected return. However, in practice an anomaly that has been found over 
decades of research in the financial markets has been that low volatility stocks have 
outperformed high volatility stocks globally out-of-period (see Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang 
(2008), Baker, Bradley and Taliaferro (2014), Clarke, de Silva and Thorley (2011)). Over the 
years extensive research has gone into identifying if the anomaly exists and the potential 
causes of it. Haugen and Heins (1972) produced a working paper in which they addressed 
deficiencies in prior studies about the relationship between risk and realized return. One of 
their main findings was that a negative relationship between risk and return in the U.S. stock 
as well as bond markets has persisted.  
 
In 1972 Fischer Black put forward an interpretation of why low risk stocks might outperform 
high risk stocks. He attributed this anomaly to an agent mispricing arising from borrowing 
restrictions (e.g. margin requirements). One of the key assumptions of the CAPM is that of 
unrestricted risk-free borrowing and lending. This is an unrealistic assumption in practice 
and as such Black (1972) developed a version of the CAPM without risk-free borrowing or 
lending. The interpretation of the agent mispricing problem is defined by Frazzini and 
Pedersen (2014) as follows: Some agents cannot use leverage, and as a result they 
overweight high beta stocks. On the other hand, some agents who can use leverage would 
underweight high beta securities and buy low beta securities and lever these up; however 
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) argue that these agents face margin constraints. The slope of 
the security market line would then be flatter than that implied by the CAPM, depending on 
the funding constraints across agents. This is further supported by the findings of Brennan 
(1993) that suggested that limits to arbitrage may create a security market line that is flatter 
than predicted by the CAPM. All in all, this suggests that the realized return vs. beta 
relationship could be overstated by the CAPM if one takes into account the market 
limitations and constraints.  
 
Since the early studies were conducted, the existence of a low beta / volatility anomaly is 
now almost an accepted phenomenon. Over the past few decades many studies have been 
conducted yielding evidence of this anomaly. It has proven to be existent and persistent in 
markets globally, both developed and emerging. While a lot of work has gone into back-
tests which have ultimately shown support for this anomaly, not as much has gone into 
explaining why this would theoretically exist. In this research the aim is to pay more 
attention into why this anomaly exists and to find the potential theoretical backing for it, if 
it exists. 
 
Baker, Bradley and Taliaferro (2014) are among the many researchers who have examined 
the low beta anomaly. They also found stocks with a lower beta (and subsequently lower 
volatility) to have outperformed those with a higher beta. They found that to be the case in 
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the U.S and in 31 developed equity markets over the periods 1968 to 2012 and 1989 to 2012 
respectively. They then decomposed the low beta anomaly into micro and macro selection 
effects. Their definition of micro selection involves selecting low beta (volatility) stocks 
within industries (or countries); while macro selection involves selecting low beta (volatility) 
industries or countries. They found that, ex ante, low or high beta (volatility) stocks, 
industries or countries have low or high betas (volatilities) respectively out-of-period. This 
finding suggests that betas (volatilities) estimated from past returns are strong predictors of 
future betas (volatilities) at the stock, industry and country level. More importantly, they 
found that the low beta anomaly is more prevalent at the micro level (i.e. at stock level 
within industries and within countries) than at the overall industry or country level. They 
attribute this to the fact that individual securities have close substitutes, in most cases, 
making it easy to find arbitrage opportunities at the stock level. However, the same cannot 
be said of the industry and country portfolios as these do not have as close substitutes. 
Given that the contributors to overall volatility are the market effect and the idiosyncratic 
effect, the authors also back-tested the idiosyncratic risk. They found that stocks with low 
idiosyncratic risk have outperformed those with a high idiosyncratic risk. Again, they found 
the relationship to be more pronounced at the stock level than at the industry or country 
level.   
 
Clarke, de Silva and Thorley (2011) showed that a minimum variance portfolio (constructed 
of the largest 1000 U.S. stocks) outperformed the market over the period 1967 to 2009. 
Their findings are consistent with the studies that have been cited and other international 
studies into low volatility portfolios. They then go into the mathematics of the minimum 
variance portfolio using Sharpe’s single-index assumption that the only source of common 
risk across equity securities is a single factor (i.e. the market portfolio). They analytically 
then solve the formula for stock weights in an unconstrained minimum-variance portfolio. In 
addition, they also rearrange the formula for the optimal stock weights in a long-only 
minimum variance portfolio. The derivation asserts that a stock’s weight is dependent on its 
beta relative to a threshold beta (i.e. their formulation only includes stocks with a beta less 
than the threshold beta). In addition their formulation down-weights stocks with a high 
idiosyncratic risk. The down-weighting of the idiosyncratic risk is consistent with the findings 
of Ang et al. (2008) who documented the low risk – high return anomaly attributable to 
idiosyncratic risk. The authors show that there is a positive relationship between beta and 
idiosyncratic risk. As such the formulation firstly identifies low beta stocks (i.e. stocks with 
betas less than the threshold beta) and then assigns weights depending on each stock’s 
idiosyncratic risk. Overall, the strategy targets stocks with an overall low volatility (i.e. low 
systematic risk and low idiosyncratic risk). 
 
In the South African market Khuzwayo (2011) back-tested the model introduced by Clarke et 
al. (2011) and contrasted the results with other traditional low risk portfolios and a market-
capitalisation (market-cap) weighted benchmark in the South African setting. His findings 
were consistent with those found in global literature where lower volatility portfolios 
outperformed the market-cap weighted portfolios at a lower risk. In addition, he found the 
portfolio constructed using the methodology introduced by Clarke et al. (2011) to give the 
best return at the lowest risk in the South African setting. He found this portfolio to have 
the lowest drawdown relative to the other portfolios he had constructed which included 
minimum variance, equally weighted benchmark, market-cap weighted benchmark, equal 
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risk contribution and a portfolio constructed of stocks with the lowest possible correlations 
between stocks. Oladele (2014) also found the low volatility portfolio constructed using the 
Clarke et al. (2011) methodology to possess superior out-of-period risk and return 
characteristics than the other low volatility portfolios. 
 
Baker and Haugen (2012) also found low volatility stocks to outperform high volatility stocks 
in 21 developed countries and in emerging markets at a lower risk. One of their logical 
explanations as to the existence of this phenomenon is the compensation of fund managers 
(i.e. where fund managers are measured on the information ratio and also receive a 
performance bonus for performance above a threshold). For example, if two stocks have the 
same expected return and one of them has a high beta and the other a low beta to the 
benchmark index, a manager who aims to maximise information ratio may avoid the lower 
beta stock if it increases the active risk (i.e. tracking error) more than the higher beta stock. 
As such these managers may have no incentive to hold low beta stocks with positive alphas, 
resulting in a flattening of the security market line. Further, low volatility portfolios exhibit 
less fat tails on both the upside and the downside. The less fat tails on the upside would 
imply that a manager who is compensated on a performance fee would reduce their 
probability of obtaining a performance fee if they are invested in low beta stocks. As such 
these managers may take on higher volatility to increase their probability of obtaining a 
performance bonus. These arguments by Baker and Haugen (2012) tie in very well with 
another important finding; that lower volatility stocks have less analyst and media coverage 
than higher volatility stocks. In addition, these stocks are held less by institutional investors 
than higher volatility stocks. This would then support the view that high beta stocks are 
generally priced at a premium relative to their low beta counterparts (i.e. low volatility 
stocks are generally priced at a discount relative to high volatility stocks).  If this is the case, 
then that would explain why low volatility portfolios have outperformed the high volatility 
portfolios out-of-period. Importantly, that would also suggest that these should continue to 
outperform as long as they are priced at a discount relative to high volatility portfolios over 
the longer term. 
 
Baker, Bradley and Wurgler (2011) attribute the low volatility anomaly to behavioural biases 
that afflict individual investors. They examined the following behavioural biases: 
I. Investor preference for lotteries – this behaviour they argue is about positive 
skewness where large positive payoffs are more likely than negative ones. However, 
there is a much larger chance of the investment producing a return below its mean. 
They argue that buying a stock with high volatility is like buying a lottery ticket where 
there is a small chance of it doubling or tripling in value in the short term; however, 
there is a much larger chance of it declining in relative value. 
II. Representativeness – to explain this they use an experiment by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1983) where they described a fictional woman named Linda who 
majored in philosophy as: single, outspoken and very bright. As a student she was 
very much concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice and participated 
in nuclear demonstrations. Tversky and Kahnemann (1983) then asked subjects 
which was more probable between: 
a. Linda is a bank teller 
b. Linda is a bank teller who is active in the women’s movement 
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Interestingly, most subjects chose B relative to A. However, B is a subset of A and as 
such A is more probable than B. Baker et al. (2011) argue that the individual 
investors could think that the road to riches is paved with speculative investments in 
new technologies (e.g. identifying and buying stocks like Microsoft Corporation at 
their IPO’s). However, the probability of identifying and buying good stocks at their 
IPO’s is extremely low and as such a sophisticated investor would generally avoid 
speculative stocks. 
III. Overconfidence – valuing stocks involves forecasting stock revenues and earnings 
into the future (e.g. over the next 5 years).  Baker et al. (2011) argue that 
overconfident investors will agree to disagree on their forecasts. Further, the extent 
of disagreement will likely be higher for more uncertain outcomes such as the 
forecasts for high volatility stocks. The extent of the differences in opinion, they 
argue, should then be reflected in the price where the optimists would buy the 
stocks while the pessimists would sell the stock. Baker et al. (2011) then argue that 
the scarcity of short sales among individual and institutional investors implies that 
pessimists act less aggressively than optimists in the markets. This would imply 
excess demand for high volatility stocks relative to low volatility stocks, making these 
stocks overvalued in the short term leading to lower subsequent returns. 
 
Yamada and Nagawatari (2010) argue that the price volatility of a stock should reflect a 
company’s earnings variability. They found stocks with high earnings variability to also 
possess high price volatility and vice versa. Furthermore, they found stocks with high 
earnings variability to have a higher earnings growth forecast error than those with low 
earnings variability. In a separate study, Hsu, Kudoh and Yamada (2013) found stocks with 
high earnings variability to possess higher growth forecast bias than those with low earnings 
variability. The fact that stocks with high earnings variability also possess high growth 
forecast bias shows that analysts are more optimistic about the growth prospects of the 
stocks with high earnings variability. Baker et al. (2011) argue that overconfident investors 
will not adjust the forecast growth for the stocks with high earnings variability. Hsu et al. 
(2013) argue that this overconfidence in growth forecasts for high volatility stocks causes 
investors to overreact to analyst optimism in the short run, causing volatile stocks to be 
overvalued. As a consequence, these would then experience low subsequent returns. On 
the other hand Hsu et al. (2013) further argue that analyst growth forecasts can still be 
informative and should not be dismissed entirely. In their study they found that stocks with 
high forward earnings yield outperformed those with a low forward earnings yield. Hsu et 
al. (2013) propose a model where the investor adjusts the analyst growth forecasts; in this 
adjustment stocks with high earnings variability get a higher adjustment than those with low 
earnings variability. 
 
Baker et al. (2011) also argue that institutional investors who may want to take advantage 
of the low volatility anomaly struggle to do so because of the benchmarks that they are 
measured against. They argue that these benchmarks inherently force institutional investors 
to avoid low beta stocks given the tracking error these stocks would introduce to their 
portfolios, thus reducing their information ratio. They also demonstrate that low beta stocks 
require a larger expected alpha than high beta stocks to increase the expected information 
ratio of a portfolio. In fact their example shows that a low beta stock can decrease the 
expected information ratio of a portfolio even if it has a positive expected alpha to the 
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benchmark. On the other hand a high beta stock can still increase the expected information 
ratio even if it has a negative expected alpha to the benchmark. In essence they 
demonstrate that the required alpha hurdle (to increase the portfolio expected information 
ratio) increases as stock beta decreases, suggesting that the required alpha hurdle is higher 
for low beta stocks. Thus from a portfolio construction perspective, institutional investors 
would find it harder to invest in low beta stocks than high beta stocks. This would imply 
higher demand for high beta stocks relative to low beta stocks causing these stocks to be 
overvalued in the short-term leading to lower subsequent returns. 
 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) define investor sentiment as the propensity to speculate, such 
that high positive investor sentiment implies a high propensity to speculate and vice versa. 
They found speculative stocks (i.e. small stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, 
etc.) to underperform safer stocks (i.e. older stocks, low volatility, profitable stocks, etc.) if 
the starting investor sentiment was high. This indicates that speculative stocks are 
overpriced during periods of high positive market sentiment. On the contrary, periods of 
low investor sentiment can be accompanied by a flight-to-safety. Caballero and Kurlat 
(2008) found the low investor sentiment market environment to be characterised by a 
decrease in demand for risky securities leading to a drop in their price or liquidity or both. In 
the equities space this market environment could be characterised by investors selling out 
of risky stocks and buying safer stocks. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) showed that 
traders become reluctant to take on positions when funding liquidity is tight, particularly in 
high-margin securities. When speculators hit their capital constraints (or risk hitting their 
capital constraints over the life of a trade) they reduce their positions leading to a decline in 
market liquidity. Further they show that the margin requirement of a stock is proportional 
to its volatility. This implies that during periods of high volatility speculators have to put up 
higher margin to enter and keep a position. As such speculators could be forced to reduce 
their positions in this market environment, reducing market liquidity. Secondly, speculators 
are more likely to hit their capital constraints over the life of a trade with high volatility 
stocks than low volatility stocks all else equal. As such, during periods of high market 
volatility one would expect speculators to be reluctant to take large positions in high 
volatility stocks given their margin requirements. This implies that one would expect the 
high volatility stocks to have higher drawdowns than their low volatility counterparts during 
periods of market turmoil. This ties in well with the assertion that low volatility portfolios 
have lower drawdowns than high volatility portfolios and can thus recover more quickly 
from these (see Papathankos and Musolf (2014) and Liu (2014)). In the South Africa market 
Khuzwayo (2011) found low volatility portfolios had considerably lower drawdowns than 
market-cap weighted portfolios, consistent with international findings. 
 
Li, Sullivan and Garcia-Feijoo (2014) examine if the low volatility anomaly can be attributed 
to market mispricing or compensation for higher systematic risk. They assert that if the 
anomaly is related to systematic risk, then the outperformance can be attributed to some 
(as of yet) unknown common risk factor. Alternatively it may be driven by a mispricing such 
as investor irrationality regarding volatility. In contrast to Ang et al. (2008), the authors find 
that the outperformance can be best explained by a market mispricing associated with 
certain characteristics present in low volatility stocks as opposed to some pervasive risk 
factor. In other words, empirical evidence suggests that volatility in the market has 
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historically been mispriced. Looked at in another way one could say that investors have paid 
a premium for high volatility stocks. 
 
The CAPM assumes that an investor uses volatility as a measure of risk and will always 
prefer lower volatility for a given expected return. Using the definition of volatility as the 
standard deviation of returns from the mean, this does not distinguish between positive and 
negative deviations from the mean. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) showed the loss aversion 
effect; where loss aversion implies that the loss of utility associated with giving up a valued 
good is greater than the utility gain associated with receiving it. Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler (1991) give the following example to illustrate this:  
A wine loving economist they knew purchased Bordeaux wines at very low prices years ago. 
Since then wines have appreciated significantly in value; as such a bottle that one would 
have purchased for $10 back in the day could now be sold at $200 at an auction. The 
economist still drinks some of that wine occasionally. However, he would not be willing to 
sell his wine at the auction price nor be willing to buy an additional bottle at that price. 
 
This implies that value appears to change when a good is incorporated into one’s 
endowment. As such Thaler (1980) called this discrepancy the endowment effect. The 
intuition behind loss aversion is that investors are more sensitive to losses (i.e. below a 
reference point) than they are to profits (i.e. above a reference point). This would imply a 
kink in the investors’ utility curve as opposed to the usual continuous utility curves. This 
would also imply that below a certain threshold investors would demand a higher discount 
to make an allocation to a risky asset than that implied by the CAPM. Consequently, below a 
certain threshold the CAPM would potentially understate the required return by investors 
to invest in a stock. As such, a need potentially arises for a CAPM model that will take into 
account the loss aversion effect. 
 
Reed, Tiu and Yoeli (2008) highlight the importance of managing downside risk. They 
highlight the shortcomings of using standard deviation of returns as the measure of risk. In 
particular, this measure assumes that the returns are symmetrical. It has been shown that 
returns for financial assets are not necessarily symmetrical. In fact, for some asset classes 
the return distributions are asymmetrical. Thus, it makes sense to look at a measure that 
focuses on the downside risk of asset classes. They come with a measure that defines risk as 
the downside deviation of asset returns (i.e. returns below a targeted threshold return). 
They found that including other asset classes (e.g. hedge funds) in one’s portfolio helped 
improve returns while also reducing the downside risk of the portfolios. They also point out 
the importance of managing downside risk especially in cases where the investor needs to 
withdraw from the investment. 
 
In recent years extensive research has gone into a downside beta CAPM. This version of the 
CAPM captures most of the features of the CAPM but does not include the assumptions of 
normality and the uniform investor preference for both upside and downside risk. Estrada 
(2007) concluded that semi-variance is a more plausible measure of risk than the traditional 
variance. He also concluded that this can be used to generate an alternative mean – semi-
variance behaviour as opposed to the traditional mean-variance behaviour. This also 
introduced downside beta as an alternative risk measure for investors and an alternative 
pricing model based on the downside beta. To highlight the importance of including 
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downside risk, Chong and Phillips (2012) proposed a CAPM version with a dual beta model 
which differentiated between up and down market betas. They showed how the discount 
rate used in valuing companies can change depending on whether one uses regular CAPM 
relative to their DCAPM (downside beta CAPM) model. They then showed how the final 
valuation of a company can change materially, depending on the final discount rate used. In 
other words, the beta used in the CAPM is an important component of the final decision to 
buy or sell a security. As such the beta component in the CAPM is of central importance. 
 
If investors are, in fact, more sensitive to losses than they are to profits on the upside then a 
measure of downside risk ought to be considered in the pricing of securities (as opposed to 
the universal beta). Ang, Chen and Xing (2002) studied the relationship between downside 
correlation and subsequent stock returns. They argue that conditional correlations would do 
a better job at capturing asymmetries in risk than conditional betas. This can be attributed 
to the fact that conditional correlations are unaffected by different idiosyncratic and market 
volatility in upside and downside market movements. They found a significant positive 
relationship between downside correlation and subsequent returns. The portfolios with the 
highest downside correlations had significantly higher returns than portfolios with lower 
downside correlation out-of-period. They also found a monotonic relationship between 
downside correlation and subsequent returns. While they did find a positive relationship 
between downside beta and subsequent return, it was not found to be statistically 
significant. On the other hand, they found no relationship between upside beta and 
correlation to subsequent returns. This would then support the assertion that investors are 
more sensitive to downside risk than they are to upside return. 
 
Ishibe, Kakuta and Sakamaki (2011) performed a similar analysis in the Japanese stock 
exchange but their analysis used volatility as opposed to correlation. They found portfolios 
constructed using the stocks with high downside volatility outperformed those with lower 
downside volatility. Their test period was over 1990 to 2010. Breaking down the periods into 
5 year periods, they found this relationship to be statistically significant over all 5 year 
periods except the period 1995 to 1999. Over all other periods the relationship is almost 
monotonic. They found the relationship to break down if one uses upside volatility or the 
traditional volatility measure. This would also support the notion that the CAPM overstates 
risk on the upside and understates investors risk preferences on the downside. Galagedera 
and Brooks (2005) also had a similar finding while back-testing a multitude of emerging 
markets, using downside beta as opposed to correlation and volatility. Secondly, their 
analysis was done at the country level as opposed to the stock level. They found portfolios 
consisting of the highest downside beta emerging market countries outperformed the low 
downside beta emerging market countries. However, they also found portfolios of high beta 
emerging market countries to have outperformed their low beta counterparts. This finding 
is consistent with that of Baker et al. (2014) who found the low beta anomaly to be more 
pronounced at the micro level than the macro level. 
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3. Research Aim 
 
The aim of this thesis is to: 
 Create low volatility portfolios in the South African setting 
a. These portfolios will include portfolios created to minimise overall volatility, 
minimise idiosyncratic risk and also low beta. 
b. The performance will be tested to detect if the performance is as a result of 
sector biases or because of a low beta anomaly. To achieve this in the South 
African setting the methodology followed is a modified version of the 
methodology of Baker, Bradley and Taliaferro (2014). 
 
Importantly, the aim of this research is not just to back-test the performance of low 
volatility portfolios. Rather, it is to understand the performance of these portfolios and to 
explain why they have outperformed. Importantly, the aim is to understand if this can be 
expected to continue into the future. As such the focus of this research will be on the 
understanding of the drivers of the outperformance. 
 
 Once the back-test results have been obtained, an extensive analysis of the 
portfolios will be performed over time. This analysis should help with the 
understanding of the rationale for the outperformance of these portfolios. 
a. The paper by Baker and Haugen (2012) will be followed closely in meeting 
this aim. The arguments put forward by the authors will be introduced and 
back-tested in the South African market. 
b. The arguments put forward by Baker, Bradley and Wurgler (2011) which 
relate to behavioural biases of investors and benchmarks exacerbating the 
low volatility anomaly will also be back-tested in the South African market. 
c. Papathankos and Musolf (2014) and Liu (2014) argued that low volatility 
portfolios have lower drawdowns than high volatility portfolios and can thus 
recover more quickly from losses. This argument will also be back-tested in 
the South African market. 
 
Ultimately it is hoped that the research will reveal if risk has been mispriced in the South 
African market. In addition, this should help to establish if the low volatility anomaly truly 
exists and if it can be expected to continue into the future. 
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4. Back-testing the low volatility anomaly in the South African 
market 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) advocates that a security’s expected return can be 
attributed to its market beta as shown below (see Sharpe (1964), Abbas, Ayub, Sargana and 
Saeed (2011), Fama and French (2004), etc.): 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖] = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓)                                                     (1) 
where 𝐸[𝑅𝑖] = expected return on asset 𝑖 
             𝑅𝑓 = risk − free rate 
             𝛽𝑖 = beta of asset 𝑖 to the 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  
            𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡 = expected 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 return  
 
Given that the risk-free rate and the expected market return are constants in (1) at a point 
in time, this relationship implies that the main determinant of a security’s expected return is 
its beta to the market index. In addition, it implies that the higher the beta of a security the 
higher the expected return. As such, if one were to construct a portfolio consisting of high 
beta vs. low beta shares the expectation would be for the high beta portfolio to outperform 
the low beta portfolio. 
Following from the above is the assertion that investors are expected to be rewarded 
according to the systematic risk they are willing to take (i.e. the higher the beta risk, the 
higher the reward). Thus, investors cannot expect to be compensated for bearing extra 
unsystematic (idiosyncratic) risk as this risk can be diversified away in a portfolio. 
The total portfolio risk (variance) can then be decomposed into systematic risk and 
unsystematic risk components as follows (see Bradfield (2000)): 
Total Risk = Systematic Risk + Unsystematic Risk 
𝜎𝑝
2 =          𝛽𝑝
2𝜎𝑚𝑘𝑡
2    +        𝜎𝑝,𝜀
2                                                     (2) 
 where 𝜎𝑝
2 = variance of portfolio 𝑃 
𝛽𝑝 = beta of portfolio 𝑃 to the 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  
𝜎𝑚𝑘𝑡
2  = variance of the 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 portfolio 
𝜎𝑝,𝜀
2 = idiosyncratic risk of portfolio 𝑃 
From equation (2) above it follows that higher beta and idiosyncratic risk imply higher total 
portfolio risk (variance). Thus, from equation (1) and (2) it follows that higher beta implies 
higher risk and higher expected return ceteris Paribas. In reality, though, this has been 
found not to be the case. In fact, academic literature dating back to Black (1972) has found 
empirical evidence that low beta portfolios have outperformed high beta portfolios. What is 
more compelling about this result is that it has been found to be persistent in the majority 
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of equity markets in both the developed and emerging markets as shown by Baker and 
Haugen (2012). This stands in stark contrast to the CAPM expectation, which asserts that 
investors are expected to be rewarded according to the level of systematic risk they are 
willing to take. This finding has also been observed in the South African setting as shown by 
Khuzwayo (2011), Panulo (2014) and Oladele (2014). It is important to understand if this is, 
in fact, an anomaly or if it could be attributed to certain characteristics of the low volatility 
portfolios that just worked well over the back-test period (e.g. they could have over-
weighted a low beta sector that performed well over the back-test period). 
4.1. Data and Methodology 
 
Methodology: 
For the purposes of this research there is a need to define what is meant by low volatility 
portfolios. The most obvious and widely used low volatility portfolio construction technique 
is the global minimum variance (GMV) portfolio (see Chow, Hsu, Kuo and Li (2014)). Ex-ante 
this portfolio comprises of risky assets such that it is expected to have the lowest volatility 
along the efficient frontier. This is the only portfolio on the efficient frontier that is 
constructed without expected return inputs. The GMV is calculated as shown below: 
min 𝜎𝑝
2 = 𝑤′𝛴𝑤                                                                                     (3) 
𝑠. 𝑡. ∑ 𝑤𝑖 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 
𝑛
𝑖
 
where 𝛴 = 𝑛 × 𝑛 covariance matrix 
𝑤 = 𝑛 × 1 vector of security weights 
From (3) it follows that the GMV portfolio, by construction, is supposed to encompass all the 
aspects of minimising volatility. By construction this portfolio is supposed to jointly reduce 
portfolio concentration, exploit correlation properties of the securities and also find stocks 
with the lowest volatilities. In reality, however, this portfolio construction technique is 
found to have some serious unwanted shortcomings as it can lead to undiversified 
portfolios. Instead of exploiting the correlation structure in the market, the GMV portfolio 
optimisation leads to highly concentrated portfolios (see Maillard, Roncalli and Teiletche 
(2010) and Amenc, Goltz and Stoyanov (2011)) which are typically concentrated in low 
volatility stocks. In the South African setting the GMV was also found to possess high levels 
of concentration in low volatility stocks as was found by Khuzwayo (2011) and Panulo 
(2014). Lee (2011) argues that although the GMV is expected to have the lowest volatility, it 
does not necessarily suggest that it is diversified from the standpoint of the asset weights 
within the portfolio. He notes that the asset weights in this portfolio can be very sensitive to 
the estimates of both volatilities and correlations.  
Given the shortcomings of the GMV portfolio optimisation, other low volatility portfolio 
construction methodologies have been introduced in international literature. These low 
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volatility portfolio construction methodologies target specific shortcomings of the low 
volatility portfolio. Some of the more popularly known low volatility strategies are listed 
below and their advantages and disadvantages are discussed. 
A: Equally weighted portfolio 
Description: 
In this construction technique one allocates an equal weight to all the stocks in the 
benchmark. The security weights in this methodology are defined as shown below (see 
Maillard, Roncalli and Teiletche (2010) and Plyakha, Uppal and Vilkov (2012)): 
𝑤𝑖 =
1
𝑛
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛                                                                                     (4) 
where 𝑛 = total 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 in the portfolio  
This low volatility portfolio construction technique negates the weight concentration 
inherent in the GMV portfolio as it yields the lowest possible weight concentration (i.e. the 
highest possible weight diversification) for a given benchmark.  
Pros: 
 Gives the most diversified portfolio at the stock weights level. 
 Achieves reduced volatility relative to the market-cap weighted benchmark as a 
result of the weight diversification. 
Cons:  
 Does not take into account the correlation structure between the assets. 
 Does not take into account the individual asset volatilities. 
 Does not explicitly target to reduce volatility; thus it may include assets with high 
volatilities and high correlations. 
 
B: Equal Risk Contribution portfolio (ERC Portfolio) 
Description: 
Maillard et al. (2010) introduced the construction technique whose aim is to maximise risk 
diversification by ensuring that all assets in the portfolio have an equal contribution to the 
overall risk of the portfolio. The optimal security weights in the Maillard et al. (2010) risk-
parity setting are constructed by performing the following optimisation: 
min 𝑓(𝑤) = ∑ ∑(𝑤𝑖(𝛴𝑤)𝑖 − 𝑤𝑗(𝛴𝑤)𝑗)
2
                                          (5) 
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0  𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
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where 𝛴 = 𝑛 × 𝑛 covariance matrix 
𝑤 = 𝑛 × 1 𝑣𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑜f 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 
The existence of a risk-parity portfolio is ensured only when the condition 𝑓(𝑤∗) = 0 is 
verified; in which case 𝑤𝑖(𝛴𝑤)𝑖 = 𝑤𝑗(𝛴𝑤)𝑗 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛. By construction this 
technique yields the lowest possible risk concentration. 
Pros: 
 Gives the most diversified portfolio in terms of asset contribution to total portfolio 
volatility. 
 Takes into account the prevailing asset volatilities and correlations. 
 Achieves reduced volatility relative to the market-cap weighted benchmark as a 
result of the maximum risk diversification. 
Cons: 
 Not easy to compute and at times may not find a solution. 
 Does not explicitly target to reduce volatility; thus it may include assets with high 
volatilities and high correlations – but the weights of these will be reduced (unlike 
the equally weighted portfolio). 
 
C: Maximum Diversification Ratio (MD Portfolio) 
Description: 
Choueifaty and Coignard (2008) introduced the diversification ratio as a measure of 
portfolio diversification. This measure essentially gives the risk reduction in a portfolio 
achieved by including stocks with low correlations. To find the portfolio with the maximum 
diversification ratio Choueifaty and Coignard (2008) perform the following optimisation: 
max Diversification Ratio = 𝐷(𝑊) =
𝑤′𝛺
√𝑤′𝛴𝑤
                                                    (6) 
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑ 𝑤𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑤 = 𝑛 × 1 vector of 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 
𝛺 = (𝜎1, … , 𝜎𝑛)
′ = 𝑛 × 1 vector of 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
𝛴 = 𝑛 × 𝑛 covariance matrix 
This low volatility portfolio construction technique targets the correlation aspect of 
equation (3). In this technique the aim is to find stocks with the lowest correlation between 
each other. 
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Pros: 
 Aim to maximise diversification in the traditional sense (i.e. adding uncorrelated 
assets to one’s portfolio). 
 Aims to exploit the correlation structure in the market by finding stocks that are 
least correlated to each other. 
 Most diversified portfolio with respect to correlation as it finds the least correlated 
combination of stocks. 
Cons: 
 May yield to high concentration depending on stock correlations. 
 Does not take into account the individual asset volatilities. 
 Does not explicitly target to reduce volatility; thus it may potentially yield a portfolio 
of highly volatile stocks with low correlations amongst themselves. 
 
D: Clarke et al. (2011) Minimum Variance Portfolio (Low Vol SI- Model) 
Description: 
Clarke, de Silva and Thorley (2011) introduced a low volatility portfolio construction 
technique that is very similar to the GMV. Clarke et al. (2011) argue that when stock return 
variations can be well described by a one factor model (i.e. using systematic risk), then the 
GMV portfolio can be approximated by a simpler methodology which calculates the 
portfolio weights as a function of CAPM beta. This method is derived from Sharpe’s (1963) 
single-index assumption that only one source of risk is common across all securities, 
consistent with the CAPM. The minimum-variance optimisation in this setting is defined by 
Clarke et al. (2011) as follows: 
𝑤𝑖 =
𝜎𝐿𝑀𝑉
2
𝜎𝜀𝑖
2 (1 −
𝛽𝑖
𝛽𝐿
) for 𝛽𝑖 < 𝛽𝐿 else 𝑤𝑖 = 0                                          (7)        
where  𝑤𝑖 = weight of 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖 
𝜎𝐿𝑀𝑉
2 = ex − ante variance of the long − only 𝐺𝑀𝑉 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜  
 𝜎𝜀𝑖
2 = ex − ante idiosyncratic variance of 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖  
 𝛽𝑖 = ex − ante market beta for 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖    
𝛽𝐿 = long − only 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 
Pros: 
 Fairly easy to compute the optimal portfolio. 
 Explicitly targets the components of the minimum variance portfolio in equation (3). 
 The determinant of whether a security is included in the portfolio is its CAPM beta 
and whether or not it is less than the threshold beta. 
 Underlying assumption is somewhat similar to the CAPM assumption that the driver 
of the expected security return is its CAPM beta. 
20 
 
o While the CAPM is expectations-based, Sharpe’s (1963) single-index model 
assumes that the driver of a security’s return (ex-post) is the market return 
and an idiosyncratic component. 
 By construction the security weight concentration is less than the GMV portfolio. 
Cons: 
 Given it’s similarity to the GMV, this portfolio could still possess higher levels of 
weight concentration than the market-cap weighted benchmarks. 
 If the explanatory power of the common factor in the market is very low, this 
portfolio construction technique would be a poor approximation of the GMV. 
 
In the South African market Khuzwayo (2011), Panulo (2014) and Oladele (2014) compared 
the characteristics of these portfolios. To simultaneously compare the risk characteristics of 
the portfolios Khuzwayo (2011) plotted a covariance bi-plot using the out-of-period monthly 
returns of the portfolios. Barr, Underhill and Kahn (1990) were the first to use this technique 
in a Finance/ Economics setting. The appealing feature of the covariance bi-plot is that it 
allows one to condense the risk characteristics of assets into a 2 dimensional risk plot. 
Information is provided below on how to read some of the portfolio risk characteristics 
using the covariance bi-plot. 
Information on reading the covariance bi-plot 
1. The starting point is that Cash is positioned at the co-ordinates (𝑥, 𝑦) = (0,0). 
2. Assume the y-axis gives the beta to a benchmark and the x-axis the unique risk 
relative to the benchmark. The sign of the unique risk is negligible and negative 
numbers should be thought of as being positive as the unique risk is always positive. 
The sign (i.e. positive or negative) of the unique risk is important for the positioning 
of the assets. 
3. The benchmark positioning is at (𝑥, 𝑦) = (0,1). 
 
Reading off risk characteristics from the covariance bi-plot 
 Beta: y co-ordinate of the asset’s position 
 Unique Risk: absolute value of the x co-ordinate of the asset’s position 
 Volatility: distance between an asset and Cash 
21 
 
 
 Tracking error: distance between asset and benchmark 
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  Asset Correlation: cosine of angle between the lines connecting Cash and the 2 
assets as shown below. 
 
Khuzwayo (2011) used the covariance bi-plot in Figure 5.1.1 to compare the risk 
characteristics of the above-mentioned low volatility portfolio construction techniques in 
the South African market out-of-period. 
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Figure 4.1.1: Covariance bi-plot of the low volatility portfolios (Khuzwayo (2011)): 
 
From Figure 4.1.1 the following observations were made regarding the low volatility 
portfolios in the South African market: 
 The Low Vol SI Model (i.e. Clarke et al. (2011)) and the Minimum Variance (GMV) 
portfolios have similar betas (i.e. +/-0.5) to the benchmark (i.e. ALSI 100) while the 
Equally Weighted, ERC Portfolio and MD Portfolio have similar and higher betas to 
the benchmark. 
 The Low Vol SI Model and the Minimum Variance portfolios have considerably lower 
volatility than the Equally Weighted, ERC Portfolio and MD Portfolio. 
 The Low Vol SI Model and Minimum Variance portfolios are highly correlated out-of-
period. Secondly, these portfolios have a lower correlation with the Equally 
Weighted, ERC Portfolio and MD Portfolio. On the contrary, the Equally Weighted, 
ERC Portfolio and MD Portfolio are highly correlated out-of-period. 
 The Low Vol SI Model and Minimum Variance portfolios have a higher (but similar) 
tracking error to the ALSI and SWIX benchmarks than the Equally Weighted, ERC 
Portfolio and MD Portfolio. 
 
From the above findings it is clear that the Low Vol SI Model (i.e. Clarke et al. (2011) 
minimum variance) and the Minimum Variance portfolios (i.e. GMV) are more distinct from 
the benchmarks (i.e. ALSI and SWIX) than the Equally Weighted, ERC Portfolio and MD 
Portfolio. Thus, to assess the low volatility anomaly the Low Vol SI Model and Minimum 
Variance portfolios are better candidates as they possess a more distinct low beta risk than 
the other methodologies.  
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The Clarke et al. (2011) methodology aims to mitigate some of the shortcomings of the GMV 
portfolio. Oladele (2014) found this low volatility portfolio construction technique to have 
superior risk-return characteristics than the other low volatility portfolios based on out-of-
period Sharpe ratios. From Figure 4.1.1 the out-of-period risk characteristics of this 
construction technique are very similar to the GMV portfolio but with improved weight 
diversification (see Khuzwayo (2011)). Thus, the Clarke et al. (2011) methodology is a good 
approximation of the GMV portfolio out-of-period and also helps improve some of the 
unwanted characteristics of the GMV portfolio. Thus, the Clarke et al. (2011) methodology 
will be used in the remainder of this thesis as a proxy for a low volatility portfolio 
constructed in the South African environment. 
In international literature the low volatility anomaly is described as the finding that low 
volatility portfolios tend to outperform high volatility portfolios at a lower risk, out-of-
period (see Baker et al. (2014), Baker and Haugen (2012) and Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) 
among others). To test the existence of the low volatility anomaly in the South African 
market there is, thus, a need to construct a high volatility portfolio in this market. The high 
volatility portfolio will be constructed in a similar methodology to equation (7). 
Clarke et al. (2011) calculate a threshold beta and all stocks with betas less than the 
threshold beta are assigned a weight in the low volatility portfolio. To construct the high 
volatility portfolio, only stocks with a beta higher than the threshold beta will be included in 
this portfolio over time. The security weights will be assigned in a similar way to equation 
(7) but stocks with a higher beta will be up-weighted as follows: 
𝑤𝑖 =
𝜎𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑉
2
𝜎𝜀𝑖
2 (
𝛽𝑖
𝛽𝐿
− 1) for 𝛽𝑖 > 𝛽𝐿 else 𝑤𝑖 = 0                                                      (8) 
where  𝜎𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑉
2 = ex − ante volatility of 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 portfolio 
 
In essence the approach in (8) will include all the stocks that were excluded in the low 
volatility portfolio. Thus, there is no stock overlap between the two portfolios. Secondly, 
high beta stocks will be up-weighted in this portfolio. As such, the main differentiator 
between the low volatility and high volatility portfolios will be the individual stock betas and 
whether or not they are lower or higher than the threshold beta. The similarity with (7) is 
that stocks with a high idiosyncratic risk will still be penalised. This is consistent with the 
CAPM which asserts that there is no reward for bearing extra idiosyncratic risk and the 
findings of Ang et al. (2008). 
In the South African market the low volatility anomaly will be tested using the low volatility 
and high volatility portfolios described above. For comparison purposes, these low and high 
volatility portfolios will also be analysed relative to the market-cap weighted benchmark in 
the South African market. 
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Data: 
The stock weights in the JSE All Share index (over time) were obtained from the BNP Paribas 
Cadiz Securities database. The total stock returns that will be used to construct the 
covariance matrix over time were also obtained from this database. 
The back-test will be run over the period 31 December 2003 to August 2014 using the 
largest 100 JSE universe as a consideration for liquidity purposes. 
At each quarter-end the low and high volatility portfolios will be constructed following the 
methodology explained below and are rebalanced quarterly. 
A fairly aggressive transaction cost of 50 basis points (bps) if assumed upon rebalancing the 
portfolios. Given that the liquidity constraints and other trading costs have not been 
incorporated in the analysis; the fairly high transaction cost should negate some of the 
other considerations that have not been incorporated. 
4.2. Back-test Results 
 
The back-test was run as follows: 
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Below are the back-test results of the low and high volatility portfolios relative to the 
market-cap weighted ALSI 100. 
4.2.1. Back-test results using Top 100 JSE share universe 
 
Figure 4.2.1.1 depicts the cumulative total returns of R100 invested in the low volatility, high 
volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios as at 31 December 2003 to 31 August 2014. 
On the figure the following abbreviations have been used: 
 Low Vol SI Model (Clarke et al. (2011) minimum variance portfolio) 
 High Vol SI Model (high volatility portfolio created using a derivation similar to Clarke 
et al. (2011)) 
 Market-cap Wt ALSI 100 (largest 100 JSE shares weighted according to their market-
capitalisation) 
30 June 2014 
Construct the minimum 
variance portfolio as was done 
on 31-Dec-03 
Rebalance the portfolio by 
changing the weights to the 
new portfolio weights 
Assume a trading cost of 50 
bps for the proportion of 
stocks sold and stocks bought 
Hold the new portfolio over 
the next 3 months. 
31 March 2004 
Construct the minimum 
variance portfolio as was done 
on 31-Dec-03 
Rebalance the portfolio by 
changing the weights to the 
new portfolio weights 
Assume a trading cost of 50 
bps for the proportion of 
stocks sold and stocks bought 
Hold the new portfolio over 
the next 3 months (i.e. 31 
March 2004 to 30 June 2004) 
31 December 2003 
Find the largest 100 JSE shares 
as of this date 
Calculate the minimum 
variance portfolio weights 
using the methodology of 
Clarke et al. (2011) 
Buy the stocks assuming a 
trading cost of 50 bps. 
Hold the portfolio over the 
subsequent 3 months (i.e. 31-
Dec-03 to 31-Mar-04). 
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Figure 4.2.1.1: Cumulative Returns constructed using Top 100 JSE shares over time 
 
From Figure 4.2.1.1 it is evident that in the South African market; the low volatility portfolio 
has outperformed both the market-cap weighted benchmark and the high volatility 
portfolio over this period, consistent with international findings (see Clarke et al. (2011), 
Baker and Haugen (2012), Baker et al. (2014), Ang et al. (2008) among others). 
Baker et al. (2014) perform a statistical test to determine if the low volatility alpha relative 
to the high volatility portfolio (i.e. low volatility – high volatility) is statistically significant 
using the market model. From the market model it can be deduced that the relative return 
of the low volatility portfolio (relative to the high volatility portfolio) can be depicted as 
follows: 
𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑉,𝑡 − 𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉,𝑡 = (𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑉 − 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉) ∗ (𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + (𝛼𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑉 − 𝛼ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉) +  𝜖𝑡          (9) 
= 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 + 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑉𝑜𝑙 𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎    
where 𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑉,𝑡 = return of 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 at time 𝑡 
𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉,𝑡 = return of ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 at time 𝑡 
 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑉 = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 of the low volatility portfolio 
𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉 = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 of the high volatility portfolio 
𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 = return of the 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 at time 𝑡 
𝛼𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑉 = 𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎 of the low volatility portfolio 
𝛼ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉 = 𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎 of the high volatility portfolio 
Baker et al. (2014) found the low volatility portfolio to have a negative net (relative to the 
high volatility portfolio) market beta which was statistically significant. In other words, they 
found the beta of the low volatility portfolio to be statistically significantly less than that of 
the high volatility portfolio out-of-period. On the contrary they found the low volatility 
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portfolio to have a statistically significant positive alpha relative to the high volatility 
portfolio out-of-period. 
Using this formulation, Table 4.2.1.1 depicts the market model regression performed on the 
low and high volatility portfolios in the South African market using monthly return data. 
Table 4.2.1.1: ANOVA table obtained from Low – High Volatility portfolio market model 
regression (December 2003 to August 2014) 
 
From Table 4.2.1.1 the findings in the South African setting are consistent with those in 
international literature. The beta of the low volatility portfolio is statistically significantly 
(i.e. p-value of 0%) less than that of the high volatility portfolio by 0.66, out-of-period in the 
South African market. On the other hand the low volatility portfolio has had a statistically 
significant positive alpha of 0.84% relative to the high volatility portfolio out-of-period as 
shown by the p-value of 1%. Overall this market model regression explains 41% of the 
variation in the outperformance of the low volatility portfolio relative to the high volatility 
portfolio. From the above table the F-statistic is significant with a p-value of 0%. Thus it can 
be concluded that the above out-of-period market model regression is statistically 
significant. 
The above results were achieved over the entire period but do not show the consistency of 
the outperformance over time. In Figure 4.2.1.2 the rolling 5 year returns of the portfolios 
are depicted, with the aim to determine the consistency of the low volatility portfolio 
outperformance relative to the high volatility portfolio. 
  
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 64%
R Square 41%
Adjusted R Square 41%
Standard Error 3.64
Observations 128
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 1 165.94 1 165.94 88.19 0%
Residual 126 1 665.83 13.22
Total 127 2 831.77
Coefficients
Standard 
Error
t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Net Alpha  (Low - High Vol) 0.84 0.33 2.55 1% 0.19 1.49 0.19 1.49
Net Beta (Low - High Vol) -0.66 0.07 -9.39 0% -0.79 -0.52 -0.79 -0.52
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Figure 4.2.1.2: Rolling 5 Year Returns constructed using Top100 JSE shares over time 
 
From Figure 4.2.1.2 it is evident that the outperformance has been achieved with 
reasonable consistency over time. On a rolling 5 year basis the low volatility portfolio has 
outperformed the high volatility portfolio and the ALSI 100, 72% and 67% of time 
respectively. This highlights the fact that the outperformance has been achieved fairly 
consistently over the long-term as opposed to there being one data point that has skewed 
the result. 
International literature has found the low volatility portfolios to have outperformed the high 
volatility portfolios while preserving their low volatility characteristic out-of-period (see 
Baker et al. (2014), Baker and Haugen (2012) and Ishibe et al. (2011)). To test if the 
portfolios have preserved their risk characteristics out-of-period in the South African setting; 
Figure 4.2.1.3 depicts the rolling 5 year ex-post volatility of the portfolios over time.  
Figure 4.2.1.3: Rolling 5 Year Ex-Post Volatility of the portfolios constructed using Top 100 
JSE shares over time 
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From Figure 4.2.1.3 it is evident that the low volatility portfolio consistently had lower risk 
than the high volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios out-of-period on a rolling 5 year 
basis. From Figure 4.2.1.2 and Figure 4.2.1.3; in the South African market the low volatility 
portfolio has been found to outperform the high volatility portfolio while preserving its low 
volatility characteristics out-of-period, consistent with international studies which have 
been cited already. 
In Figure 4.2.1.4 below the rolling 5 year Sharpe ratios of the portfolios are depicted. 
Figure 4.2.1.4: Rolling 5 Year Sharpe ratios of the portfolios constructed using Top 100 JSE 
shares over time 
 
The low volatility (Figure 4.2.1.3) has been accompanied by a predominantly higher Sharpe 
ratio for the low volatility portfolio relative to the high volatility and market-cap weighted 
portfolios over time. However, it is important to note that the Sharpe ratio has not always 
been higher for the low volatility portfolio as it has produced lower Sharpe ratios during 
times when the performance (Figure 4.3.1.2) has lagged the market-cap weighted and high 
volatility portfolios. 
Determining if the observed low volatility outperformance (relative to market-cap 
weighted and high volatility portfolios) is attributable to a sector bias effect 
Given that the aim of this thesis is to understand if the outperformance is a result of a low 
beta effect or rather a sector effect, Table 4.2.1.2 below depicts the average sector 
weightings within the low volatility and high volatility portfolios over the period December 
2003 to August 2014. This analysis is expected to show if there is a sector bias within the 
portfolios; for example it would show if there is a sector that the one methodology has 
preferred relative the other which could have resulted in the outperformance. 
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Table 4.2.1.2: Average Sector allocations in the portfolio (Dec 2003 – Aug 2014) 
 
From Table 4.2.1.2 it is evident that the low volatility portfolio has been significantly 
overweight the Listed Property sector relative to the ALSI 100. On average the low volatility 
portfolio has a weight of 41% in this sector while the ALSI 100 only has 3% (later it will be 
shown than the Listed Property sector has a very low beta relative to the market-cap 
weighted ALSI). On the contrary the allocation to Listed Property in the high volatility 
portfolio has been similar to that of the ALSI 100 (i.e. an average of 1% in the high volatility 
portfolio). One could argue that the observed outperformance is more of a sector effect 
rather than a low beta effect. 
Figure 4.2.1.5 below depicts the performance of the Listed Property sector relative to the 
JSE All Share index (ALSI) over the back-test period (i.e. December 2003 – August 2014). 
Figure 4.2.1.5: Performance of Listed Property vs. the JSE All Share Index 
 
Given that Listed Property has outperformed the ALSI as shown in Figure 4.2.1.5 this could 
skew the interpretation of the outperformance observed in the low volatility portfolio. 
Given that the low volatility portfolio has been considerably overweight the Listed Property 
sector as shown in Table 4.2.1.2; the observed outperformance could be a result of the 
overweight Property position relative to the high volatility and market-cap weighted 
portfolios as opposed to a low beta effect. 
Sector
Low Vol SI 
Model
High Vol SI 
Model
Market Cap Wt 
ALSI100
Resources 0% 42% 39%
Financials 58% 22% 20%
Listed Property 41% 1% 3%
Industrials 42% 36% 41%
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After back-testing the low risk anomaly in the U.S. market; Baker et al. (2014) decompose 
the anomaly into its micro and macro components. The macro component comes from 
selecting low beta industries or countries; while the micro component comes from selecting 
low beta stocks within industries or countries. The appealing feature of this methodology is 
that it enables one to investigate how much of the low beta anomaly comes from industry 
selection and how much comes from selecting low beta stocks within industries or 
countries. In this case this should help determine how much of the outperformance can be 
attributed to the Property and FINDI vs. RESI sector effects. In the U.S. market they found 
the low beta anomaly to not be statistically significant at the sector level. However, they 
found the low beta anomaly to be statistically significant at stock selection level within 
industries. From this it is concluded that in the U.S. market the low beta anomaly is not a 
result of an industry selection effect but rather a result of selecting low beta stocks within 
industries. In other words, Baker et al. (2014) found the low volatility anomaly to be 
attributable to a stock selection effect rather than an industry effect. 
In this thesis a statistical test is performed in the South African market to determine if the 
anomaly is attributable to low beta stock selection or rather a sector selection effect, similar 
to Baker et al. (2014). The potential sector selection effects that could bias the anomaly in 
the South African market are highlighted in Table 4.2.1.2. From this it is evident that the low 
volatility portfolio is overweight Listed Property shares relative to the high volatility 
portfolio. Secondly, the low volatility portfolio is underweight the Resources sector (RESI) 
and overweight the Financial and Industrial (FINDI) sectors relative to the high volatility 
portfolio. To test for potential sector biases in the results, the methodology of Baker et al. 
(2014) was adapted in the South African market as formulated in the regression analysis 
below: 
𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑉,𝑡 − 𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡) + 𝛾(𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼,𝑡)                (10) 
where 𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑉,𝑡 = return of 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 portfolio at time 𝑡 
𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉,𝑡 = return of ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 portfolio at time 𝑡 
𝑅𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝,𝑡 = return of 𝑆𝐴 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 at time 𝑡 
𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 = return of 𝐽𝑆𝐸 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 index at time 𝑡 
𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼,𝑡 = return of the 𝐽𝑆𝐸 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 & 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 25 index at time 𝑡 
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼,𝑡 = return of the 𝐽𝑆𝐸 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠 10 index at time 𝑡 
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Table 4.2.1.3: Regression Results using ALSI 100 universe (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
The variation in the outperformance (of the low volatility over the high volatility portfolio) 
explained by the Listed Property and FINDI vs. RESI sector effects is 79% as shown by the 
adjusted R-squared in Table 4.2.1.3. The F-statistic has a p-value of 0% implying that at least 
one of the independent variables is a significant explanatory variable. In addition it can be 
concluded from the significance of the F-statistic that the relationship between the 
independent variables and the response variable is statistically significant. From the above 
ANOVA table, the t-statistics for both independent variables are significant (i.e. 14.2 and 
4.3) suggesting that both these variables are significant at explaining the outperformance of 
the low volatility portfolio. This can also be witnessed by the low p-values of 0.0% for both 
the Listed Property and FINDI-RESI sector effects. All else equal a 1.0% outperformance from 
Listed Property would lead to a 0.6% outperformance of the low volatility portfolio. 
Similarly, a 1% outperformance of the FINDI over the RESI would lead to a 0.2% 
outperformance of the low volatility portfolio relative to high volatility portfolio, all else 
equal. Having taken into account the sector effects, the low volatility portfolio does not 
have a significant alpha relative to the high volatility portfolio over the back-test period. The 
alpha of -0.05 has a t-statistic of -0.28 and a poor p-value of 78.4%. At face value this 
evidence would suggest that, in the South African market the low volatility anomaly can be 
attributed to a Listed Property and FINDI vs. RESI sector effect over the period December 
2003 to August 2014 as opposed to a low volatility alpha. 
To establish if the above findings have held consistently over time the regression analysis in 
equation (10) is performed on a rolling 5 year basis. The t-statistics of the regression 
coefficients and the adjusted R-squared are depicted in Figure 4.2.1.6. 
  
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 89%
R Square 80%
Adjusted R Square 79%
Standard Error 2.14
Observations 128
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 2 257.17 1 128.59 245.52 0%
Residual 125 574.60 4.60
Total 127 2 831.77
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Alpha -0.05 0.19 -0.28 78% -0.43 0.32 -0.43 0.32
FINDI - RESI net Property 0.17 0.04 4.28 0% 0.09 0.25 0.09 0.25
SA Listed Property - SA Equity 0.61 0.04 14.23 0% 0.53 0.70 0.53 0.70
34 
 
Figure 4.2.1.6: Rolling 5 Year T-statistic and R-Squared of Relative Return 
 
From Figure 4.2.1.6 the regression analysis (equation (10)) has explained more than 70% of 
the variation in outperformance of the low volatility portfolio relative to the high volatility 
portfolio over time as shown by the adjusted R-squared. From this it can be concluded that 
the independent variables explain most of the variation in outperformance of the low 
volatility portfolio over the high volatility portfolio. 
The rolling t-statistic of the relative performance of Listed Property (relative to the JSE All 
Share index) has been 8.0 or above. As expected, this implies that there is a significant 
positive linear relationship between the outperformance of the low volatility over the high 
volatility portfolio and the outperformance of the Listed Property sector. Over the entire 
back-test period the t-statistic for the FINDI-RESI was 4.28 indicating a strong positive 
relationship. However, it can be noted from Figure 4.2.1.6 that this relationship has not held 
consistently over time. The t-statistic for this variable has been fairly low over time, in most 
cases it has been below 2.0. Consistent with Table 4.2.1.3 the t-statistic for alpha, holding 
the Listed Property and FINDI vs. RESI sector effect constant, has been close to zero over 
time. 
Figure 4.2.1.7 below depicts the p-values of the t-statistics shown in Figure 4.2.1.6 over 
time.  
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Figure 4.2.1.7: P-Values of the rolling 5 year regression t-statistics 
 
On a 5 year rolling basis the p-value for the Listed Property sector outperformance (relative 
to the JSE All Share) has been almost 0.0% consistently. As such this confirms that the Listed 
Property sector outperformance explains a significant part of the outperformance of the low 
volatility relative to the high volatility portfolio. However, the same cannot be said of the p-
value of the FINDI-RESI sector effect which has predominantly been above 10%. In addition, 
the p-value for the FINDI-RESI sector effect has been very volatile on a rolling 5 year basis. 
Given the rolling p-values for this sector effect; one cannot conclude that there is a 
significant linear relationship between the FINDI-RESI sector outperformance and the 
outperformance of the low volatility portfolio over the high volatility portfolio holding the 
relative performance of the Listed Property sector constant. 
Holding the FINDI-RESI and Listed Property relative performance constant, one cannot 
conclude that the low volatility portfolio has a statistically significant alpha relative to the 
high volatility portfolio. The t-statistic for the alpha has consistently been close to zero over 
time and the p-value has been 15% or worse. 
Based on this analysis the logical conclusion that follows is that the outperformance of the 
low volatility portfolio over the high volatility portfolio can be primarily attributed to the 
overweight Listed Property sector. In other words the outperformance could have been as a 
result of the asset allocation decision (i.e. overweight Property) as opposed to a low beta 
outperformance. 
One of the assumptions of multivariate regression is that of no multi-collinearity. This 
problem arises if the independent variables are correlated. The problem with multi-
collinearity, as shown by Vasu and Elmore (1975), is that it results in large standard errors 
and subsequently low t-statistics. As such, it increases the probability of committing a type II 
error where one erroneously fails to reject a false null hypothesis. This implies that one is 
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more likely to erroneously fail to detect a relationship that truly exists between the 
dependent and independent variables. 
To test if there is a linear relationship between the explanatory variables the following 
regression analysis is performed: 
𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼,𝑡 = 𝛽 ∗ (𝑅𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡) + 𝛼                                     (11) 
𝑤here the 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 are as 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 in equation (10)  
Table 4.2.1.4: ANOVA table obtained from regression of FINDI-RESI relative to Listed 
Property (Dec 2003 – Aug 2014) 
 
From Table 4.2.1.4 there is a statistically significant positive linear relationship between the 
Listed Property outperformance over the JSE ALSI and FINDI – RESI outperformance as 
shown by the p-value of 0%. For every 1% outperformance from the Listed Property sector 
(relative to the Equity market), the FINDI is expected to outperform the RESI sector by 
0.68% all else equal. Given the statistically significant F-statistic, with a p-value of 0%, it can 
be concluded that the regression is statistically significant and the results are reliable. This 
linear relationship between the independent variables of equation (10) may distort the 
analysis given the significant correlation between them. 
Given the potential multi-collinearity problem inherent in the regression in (10), an 
alternative methodology is used to test the explanatory power of the Listed Property and 
FINDI vs. RESI sector effects. This methodology was introduced by Xiong, Ibbotson, Idzorek 
and Chen (2010) who decomposed the performance of a balanced portfolio into the 
following components: strategic asset allocation, tactical asset allocation and stock 
selection. The final aim of their research was to show how the overall performance of a 
balanced fund can be decomposed into these components. Adapting their approach into 
this low volatility vs. high volatility setting one can decompose the relative return of the low 
volatility vs. high volatility portfolio as follows: 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 63%
R Square 39%
Adjusted R Square 39%
Standard Error 4.82
Observations 128.00
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 1 904.03 1 904.03 82.11 0%
Residual 126 2 921.92 23.19
Total 127 4 825.95
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.42 0.43 0.99 33% -0.42 1.26 -0.42 1.26
SA Listed Property - SA Equity 0.68 0.08 9.06 0% 0.53 0.83 0.53 0.83
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low volatility outperformance
= Property outperformance
+ FINDI Outperformance net the Property effect
+ low volatility alpha net of the FINDI vs RESI sector effect 
𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑉,𝑡 − 𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉,𝑡
= (𝑅𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡) + {(𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼,𝑡) − (𝑅𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡)}
+ {𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑉,𝑡 − 𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉,𝑡 − (𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼,𝑡)}                                  (12) 
where 𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑉,𝑡 = return of 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 portfolio at time 𝑡 
𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑉,𝑡 = return of ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 portfolio at time 𝑡 
𝑅𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝,𝑡 = return of 𝑆𝐴 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 at time 𝑡 
𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 = return of 𝐽𝑆𝐸 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 index at time 𝑡 
𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼,𝑡 = return of the 𝐽𝑆𝐸 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 & 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 25 index at time 𝑡 
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼,𝑡 = return of the 𝐽𝑆𝐸 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠 10 index at time 𝑡 
Xiong et al. (2010) then perform a regression of the individual components on the right 
hand side of equation (12) against the relative performance. The R-squared obtained from 
the individual components in this derivation then show the variation in outperformance 
explained by these components.  
Figure 4.2.1.8: Variation in outperformance explained by sector effect vs. low beta effect 
 
From Figure 4.2.1.8 it is evident that the majority of the variation in outperformance can be 
explained by the Property sector effect. This component explains more than 80% of the 
variation in outperformance, consistent with the finding from the regression in (10). While 
the variation explained by the FINDI – RESI sector effect (net of Property) has increased 
recently, it still explains a very low proportion of the variation in the low volatility 
outperformance over the high volatility portfolio. The remaining low beta vs. high beta 
alpha (net of the sector effects) has explained a very low proportion of the variation in the 
low volatility outperformance over the high volatility portfolio over time. From Figure 
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4.2.1.8 it can be concluded that the majority of the variation in the low volatility 
outperformance over the high volatility portfolio can be attributed to a Property sector 
effect. 
The evidence from the statistical tests performed thus far suggests that the low volatility 
effect can be attributed to a Listed Property sector effect in the South African market; and is 
not widespread across the sectors. If that is the case then one would expect the low 
volatility outperformance to disappear if the Listed Property sector effect is neutralised or 
excluded. To test empirically if the outperformance (i.e. low volatility vs. high volatility) can 
be attributed to a Property sector effect alone, Property stocks will be excluded from the 
investable universe and the back-test will be re-run. If the outperformance disappears it can 
then be concluded that in the South African setting; the low volatility outperformance 
relative to the high volatility portfolio has just been a by-product of a Property sector effect.  
4.2.2. Back-test results using Top 100 JSE shares excluding Property stocks 
 
Figure 4.2.2.1 depicts the cumulative total returns of R100 invested in the low volatility, high 
volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios as at 31 December 2003 to 31 August 2014. 
On the figure the following abbreviations have been used: 
 Low Vol SI Model ex Property (Clarke et al. (2011) minimum variance portfolio 
constructed using JSE largest 100 shares excluding Property shares) 
 High Vol SI Model ex Property (high volatility portfolio created using a derivation 
similar to Clarke et al. (2011) using JSE largest 100 shares excluding Property shares) 
 Market-cap Wt ex Property (market-cap weighted portfolio of the largest 100 JSE 
shares excluding Property shares – for consistency in comparisons) 
 
Figure 4.2.2.1: Cumulative Returns constructed using Top 100 JSE shares excluding 
Property 
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After Property shares are excluded from the investable universe the performance of the low 
volatility portfolio has marginally worsened (i.e. 796 in Figure 4.2.1.1 vs. 741 in Figure 
4.2.2.1). However, this portfolio has still outperformed both the high volatility and market-
cap weighted portfolios (all excluding Property shares). This would then suggest that there is 
more to the low volatility outperformance than just a Property sector effect.  
To test the statistical significance of the outperformance the market model regression, as 
was formulated in equation (9) is performed on the monthly returns of the portfolios. This 
will help establish if the low volatility portfolio has a significant positive alpha relative to the 
high volatility portfolio out-of-period, after excluding Property stocks from the investable 
universe. 
Table 4.2.2.1 below shows the ANOVA table obtained from the market model regression. 
Table 4.2.2.1: ANOVA table obtained from Low – High Vol portfolio market model 
regression (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
The above market model regression has an R-squared of 41% and a significant F-statistic as 
shown by the p-value of 0%. As such, it can be concluded that the market model regression 
is statistically significant. After excluding Property stocks from the investable universe, the 
beta of the low volatility portfolio is statistically significantly less than that of the high 
volatility portfolio by 0.54 as shown by the p-value of 0%; out-of-period. In addition, the low 
volatility portfolio has a statistically significant positive alpha of 0.73% (out-of-period) 
relative to the high volatility portfolio as depicted by the p-value of 1%. Thus, contrary to 
the finding in the previous section; it can be concluded from empirical and statistical tests 
that the low volatility outperformance relative to the high volatility portfolio is prevalent 
even after the exclusion of the Property sector effect in the South African market. 
Figure 4.2.2.2 depicts the rolling 5 year returns of the low volatility, high volatility and 
market-cap weighted portfolios. This will help establish if the outperformance has been 
achieved consistently over time. 
  
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 64%
R Square 41%
Adjusted R Square 40%
Standard Error 3.11
Observations 128
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 833.90 833.90 86.22 0%
Residual 126 1 218.67 9.67
Total 127 2 052.57
Coefficients
Standard 
Error
t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Net Alpha  (Low - High Vol) 0.73 0.28 2.59 1% 0.17 1.29 0.17 1.29
Net Beta (Low - High Vol) -0.54 0.06 -9.29 0% -0.66 -0.43 -0.66 -0.43
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Figure 4.2.2.2: Rolling 5 Year Returns using Top 100 JSE shares excluding Property 
 
From Figure 4.2.2.2 the low volatility portfolio has outperformed the high volatility portfolio 
67% of the time, while also outperforming the market-cap weighted portfolio 57% of the 
time on a rolling 5 year basis. While these incidences of outperformance are lower than the 
case where Property stocks are included in the analysis, they are still meaningful and imply 
superior performance from the low volatility portfolio. 
Figure 4.2.2.3 below depicts the rolling 5 year ex-post risk of the low volatility, high volatility 
and market-cap weighted portfolios over time, where the investable universe excludes 
Property stocks.  
Figure 4.2.2.3: Rolling 5 Year Volatility of the portfolios constructed using Top 100 JSE 
shares excluding Property shares 
 
From Figure 4.2.2.3 it is evident that the low volatility portfolio has retained its risk 
characteristics out-of-period. This portfolio has consistently had significantly lower risk than 
both the market-cap weighted and high volatility portfolios over time, highlighting that the 
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low volatility findings in the South African setting have been consistent with the findings in 
other international markets. 
Figure 4.2.2.4 below depicts the rolling 5 year Sharpe ratios of the portfolios over time. 
Figure 4.2.2.4: Rolling 5 Year Sharpe ratios of the portfolios constructed using Top 100 JSE 
shares excluding Property shares 
 
After the exclusion of Property shares from the investable universe, the low volatility 
portfolio has still predominantly produced a higher Sharpe ratio than both the market-cap 
weighted and high volatility portfolios over time. This suggests that the risk-return 
characteristics of the low vs. high volatility portfolios cannot be attributed to only a Property 
sector effect as the findings are similar before and after the exclusion of Property stocks. 
Determining if the observed low volatility outperformance (relative to market-cap 
weighted and high volatility portfolios) is attributable to a sector bias effect 
Again it is important to analyse the sector decomposition within the portfolios over time to 
gauge if there is a sector that has been significantly overweighted. This would help one 
understand if the outperformance observed is a result of a sector bias or if it is in fact a low 
volatility anomaly. 
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Table 4.2.2.2: Sector allocation in the portfolios (Dec 2003 – Aug 2014) 
 
From Table 4.2.2.2 it is evident that the low volatility portfolio has been significantly 
overweight Industrials and Financial stocks relative to the high volatility and market-cap 
weighted portfolios. On average the low volatility portfolio has been 38% underweight 
Resources relative to the high volatility portfolio. One can argue that the outperformance of 
the low volatility portfolio could just be a sector effect as opposed to a low beta effect given 
that the FINDI has materially outperformed the RESI over this period as depicted in Figure 
4.2.2.5 below. 
Figure 4.2.2.5: Cumulative Returns of RESI and FINDI vs. JSE All Share index 
 
A regression analysis similar to Baker et al. (2014) is performed to help disentangle if the 
outperformance can be attributed to a sector effect (i.e. overweight FINDI vs. RESI). The 
formulation used is as follows: 
𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾(𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼,𝑡)                     (13) 
where 𝑅𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝,𝑡 = return of 𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 portfolio (excl. Property)at time 𝑡 
𝑅ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝,𝑡 = return of ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 portfolio (excl. Property)at time 𝑡 
𝑅𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼,𝑡 = return of the 𝐽𝑆𝐸 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 & 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 25 index at time 𝑡 
𝑅𝑅𝐸𝑆𝐼,𝑡 = return of the 𝐽𝑆𝐸 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠 10 index at time 𝑡 
  
Sector
Low Vol SI 
Model ex 
Property
High Vol SI 
Model ex 
Property
Market Cap Wt 
ex Property
Resources 4% 42% 40%
Financials 27% 21% 18%
Industrials 69% 38% 43%
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Table 4.2.2.3: Regression Results excluding Property stocks (December 2003 – August 
2014) 
 
The R-squared from the above regression is 45% and the F-statistic is significant with a p-
value of 0%. While it can be concluded that the regression is statistically significant, there is 
still a significant proportion of the variation (i.e. more than 50%) in outperformance that 
remains unexplained. The FINDI vs. RESI sector effect is a statistically significant explanatory 
variable with a t-statistic of 10.1 and a p-value of 0%. The average outperformance, net of 
the FINDI – RESI sector effect, is -0.1% as shown by the intercept coefficient in Table 4.2.2.1. 
However the p-value of this coefficient is 79%, implying that it cannot be concluded the 
average outperformance (net of the FINDI vs. RESI sector effect) is statistically significantly 
different from zero. 
In Figure 4.2.2.6 this relationship is tested on a rolling 5 year basis over time to determine if 
it has held consistently over time. 
Figure 4.2.2.6: Rolling 5 Year T-statistic and R-Squared of Regression 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 67%
R Square 45%
Adjusted R Square 44%
Standard Error 3.01
Observations 128.00
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 914.69 914.69 101.29 0%
Residual 126 1 137.88 9.03
Total 127 2 052.57
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Alpha -0.07 0.27 -0.27 79% -0.60 0.46 -0.60 0.46
FINDI - RESI 0.44 0.04 10.06 0% 0.35 0.52 0.35 0.52
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From Figure 4.2.2.6 the FINDI-RESI relative performance is a significant explanatory variable 
of the outperformance of the low volatility relative to the high volatility portfolio, with the t-
statistic consistently above 4.0. However, this variable has predominantly explained less 
than 50% of the variation in outperformance over time. Thus, there is still a significant 
proportion of the variation (i.e. more than 50%) in the low volatility portfolio 
outperformance over the high volatility portfolio that remains unexplained. 
Figure 4.2.2.7 depicts the p-values of the regression variables. 
Figure 4.2.2.7: Rolling 5 year P-Values of the regression 
 
The FINDI-RESI sector effect has been a significant explanatory variable with a p-value 
consistently close to zero over time. On the other hand the low volatility alpha net of the 
FINDI-RESI sector effect has not been significant over time. From Figure 4.2.2.6 and Figure 
4.2.2.7 above it can be concluded the FINDI vs. RESI sector effect explains a statistically 
significant portion of the low volatility effect in the South African market. To test if the low 
volatility anomaly exists after the exclusion of the Listed Property and FINDI vs. RESI shares 
in the South African market; the back-test will be re-run excluding the Listed Property and 
RESI shares from the investable universe. This back-test will reveal if the outperformance of 
the low volatility portfolio (relative to the high volatility portfolio) is still prevalent after 
excluding the Property and FINDI vs. RESI sector effects. If the low volatility portfolio 
outperformance over the high volatility portfolio suddenly disappears after the 
neutralisation of these sector effects, it can then be concluded that the low volatility effect 
has been as a result of the Listed Property and FINDI vs. RESI sector effects in the South 
African market.  
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4.2.3. Back-test results using Top 100 JSE shares excluding Property & RESI 
stocks 
 
Figure 4.2.3.1 depicts the cumulative total returns of R100 invested in the low volatility, high 
volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios as at 31 December 2003 to 31 August 2014. 
On the figure the following abbreviations have been used: 
 Low Vol SI Model ex Property & RESI (Clarke et al. (2011) minimum variance portfolio 
constructed using JSE largest 100 shares excluding Property & RESI shares) 
 High Vol SI Model ex Property & RESI (high volatility portfolio created using a 
derivation similar to Clarke et al. (2011) using JSE largest 100 shares excluding 
Property & RESI shares) 
 Market-cap Wt ex Property & RESI (market-cap weighted portfolio of the largest 100 
JSE shares excluding Property & RESI shares) 
 
Figure 4.2.3.1: Cumulative Returns using Top 100 shares excluding Property & RESI 
 
From Figure 4.2.3.1 it is evident that both the low volatility and high volatility portfolios 
have underperformed the market-cap weighted portfolio. This could suggest that the 
outperformance of the prior low volatility portfolios achieved over the market-cap weighted 
portfolios may have been as a result of the underweight Resources sector position. Yamada 
and Nagawatari (2010) argue that the price volatility of a stock should reflect the underlying 
expected earnings variability. As such the sector over/ underweight position would be 
driven by the underlying sector expected earnings variability. This would imply that sectors 
with low or high variability in their earnings would, by construction, have overweight 
positions in the low or high volatility portfolios respectively. The exclusion of sectors that 
the low or high volatility portfolios would have invested in, forces these portfolios into 
sectors they otherwise would not have invested in. As such this may distort the resultant 
portfolio characteristics after the imposition of sector constraints. This potential distortion 
of the portfolio characteristics may be material and may explain the underperformance of 
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the low volatility portfolio relative to the market-cap weighted portfolio. Later in this 
chapter the impact of the imposition of these sector constraints on the portfolios will be 
analysed in detail. 
More importantly the outperformance of the low volatility portfolio over the high volatility 
portfolio has still been prevalent, even after excluding both the Property and RESI vs. FINDI 
sector effects. This is consistent with international literature (see Baker et al. (2011), Baker 
& Haugen (2012) among others) which noted the low volatility anomaly as the 
outperformance of the low volatility portfolios relative to the high volatility portfolios. The 
above finding suggests that there is more to the outperformance of the low volatility 
portfolio over the high volatility portfolio than just a sector effect. Importantly, this finding 
is consistent with the findings from the statistical tests performed earlier in this chapter (i.e. 
excluding Property shares from investable universe) and Baker et al. (2011) who also 
concluded that the low volatility effect (i.e. low volatility outperformance relative to high 
volatility) cannot be attributable to just an industry or country effect. In fact they found the 
anomaly to be more pronounced at the stock selection level within industries or within 
countries. 
In Table 4.2.3.1 below the statistical significance of this outperformance is tested using the 
market model regression as was defined in equation (9). The aim of this regression is to 
determine if the low volatility portfolio has a statistically significant positive alpha relative to 
the high volatility portfolio out-of-period, after excluding Property and Resources shares. 
Table 4.2.3.1: ANOVA table obtained from Low – High Vol portfolio market model 
regression (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
The market model regression in Table 4.2.3.1 has explained 25% of the variation in the low 
volatility outperformance relative to the high volatility portfolio. While this R-squared is low, 
the statistically significant F-statistic with a p-value of 0% implies that the regression is 
statistically significant. After excluding the Property and RESI shares from the investable 
universe, the beta of the low volatility portfolio is statistically significantly (p-value of 0%) 
less than that of the high beta portfolio by 0.36, out-of-period. The low volatility portfolio 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 50%
R Square 25%
Adjusted R Square 25%
Standard Error 2.66
Observations 128
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 299.83 299.83 42.36 0%
Residual 126 891.93 7.08
Total 127 1 191.75
Coefficients
Standard 
Error
t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Net Alpha  (Low - High Vol) 0.47 0.24 1.92 6% -0.01 0.96 -0.01 0.96
Net Beta (Low - High Vol) -0.36 0.05 -6.51 0% -0.46 -0.25 -0.46 -0.25
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has a positive alpha of 0.47% relative to the high volatility portfolio and this has a p-value of 
6%. Thus, we conclude that the low volatility portfolio has a positive alpha relative to the 
high volatility portfolio of 0.47% with a probability of 94%. From the above results it can be 
concluded that the low volatility portfolio has consistently had a positive alpha relative to 
the high volatility portfolio whether the Property and RESI shares are included or excluded 
from the investable universe. These results would suggest that the ex-post security market 
line is flatter than is implied by the CAPM. These findings in the South African setting are 
consistent with those in international literature (see Baker et al. (2014), Baker & Haugen 
(2012), Hsu et al. (2013) among others). 
To investigate if this outperformance has just been a one-off or if it has been achieved 
consistently over time, Figure 4.2.3.2 below depicts the rolling 5 year returns of the 
portfolios. 
Figure 4.2.3.2: Rolling 5 Year Returns using Top 100 shares excluding Property & RESI 
 
From 3.2.15 it is evident that both the low volatility and high volatility portfolios have 
underperformed the market-cap weighted portfolio fairly consistently over time. An in-
depth analysis of the potential causes of this underperformance will be performed later in 
this chapter. 
On the other hand, the low volatility portfolio has outperformed the high volatility portfolio 
fairly consistently on a rolling 5 year basis. The low volatility portfolio has outperformed the 
high volatility portfolio 84% of the time on a rolling 5 year basis, suggesting strong and 
consistent outperformance. Given that this outperformance has been achieved after taking 
into account the sector effects, it would suggest that it is not just as a result of a sector bias. 
In fact it can be concluded that in the South African market the low beta anomaly is 
prevalent at the stock selection level, consistent with Baker et al. (2014). On the other hand 
this finding would also support the findings of Black (1972) that the security market line is 
flatter than that implied by the CAPM. 
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Figure 4.2.3.3 below depicts the rolling 5 year ex-post volatility of the portfolios over time. 
This will show if the risk characteristics have been preserved out-of-period after excluding 
the Property and RESI stocks from the investable universe. 
Figure 4.2.3.3: Rolling 5 Year Volatility of the portfolios constructed using the Top 100 JSE 
shares excluding Property and RESI stocks 
 
Consistent with the previous findings and international literature the low volatility and high 
volatility portfolios have preserved their risk characteristics out-of-period. Thus, it can be 
concluded that in the South African market the low volatility portfolio has outperformed the 
high volatility portfolio at a significantly lower risk out-of-period even after taking into 
account the Property and RESI vs. FINDI sector effects. 
Figure 4.2.3.4 below depicts the rolling 5 year Sharpe ratios of the portfolios over time. 
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Figure 4.2.3.4: Rolling 5 Year Sharpe ratios of the portfolios constructed using the Top 100 
JSE shares excluding Property and RESI stocks 
 
The exclusion of Property and Resources stocks from the investable universe has resulted in 
increased Sharpe ratios for the market-cap weighted and high volatility portfolios. The 
inclusion of these sector constraints has resulted in the market-cap weighted portfolio 
producing a predominantly higher Sharpe ratio than both the low volatility and high 
volatility portfolios over time. This highlights the change in the risk-return portfolio 
characteristics that have been brought about by the sector constraints. On the other hand it 
is evident from Figure 4.2.3.4 that the low volatility portfolio has consistently had a higher 
Sharpe ratio than the high volatility portfolio in the South African environment, consistent 
with international literature.  
Determining if the observed low volatility outperformance (relative to the high volatility 
portfolio) is attributable to a sector bias effect 
After taking into account the FINDI vs. RESI sector effect, Table 4.2.3.2 investigates if there 
has been a prevalent sector effect within FINDI. This will help establish if the portfolios have 
had a certain preference for particular sectors which could have inherently caused the out/ 
underperformance. 
Table 4.2.3.2 Average Sector Weights within the portfolios (December 2003 – August 
2014) 
 
Sector
Low Vol SI 
Model ex 
Property & RESI
High Vol SI 
Model ex 
Property & RESI
Market Cap Wt 
ex Property & 
RESI
Financials 29% 35% 29%
Industrials 71% 65% 71%
50 
 
From Table 4.2.3.2 it is evident that the sector weightings are less extreme than was 
witnessed in the previous section (i.e. including Resources and Property shares from 
investable universe). However, a preference for Financials stocks is noticeable for the high 
volatility portfolio relative to the low volatility portfolio. 
The next step that will be pursued is to run the back-test on a sector-neutral basis as this 
will eliminate any sector effects which may be inherent in the results presented thus far.  
4.2.4. Back-test results using Top 100 JSE shares with sector neutrality 
constraint 
 
In this section the back-test is run within sectors and then the low volatility and high 
volatility portfolios are constructed such that the sector weights (i.e. Resources, Financials, 
Industrials and Property) are the same as the ALSI 100 over time as shown below: 
 At each quarter-end from December 2003 to August 2014 construct the low and high 
volatility portfolios within the Resources, Financials, Industrials and Listed Property 
JSE sectors. 
 Assign the weights in the final low (high) volatility portfolio such that the sector 
weights of this portfolio are similar to those in the JSE ALSI100 at each quarter-end. 
 
In essence this approach ensures that there are no sector biases within the portfolios and 
the observed out-of-period performance is as a result of the low or high beta stock selection 
within the sectors. 
Figure 4.2.4.1 depicts the cumulative total returns of R100 invested in the low volatility, high 
volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios as at 31 December 2003 to 31 August 2014. 
On the figure the following abbreviations have been used: 
 Low Vol SI Sector Neutral (Clarke et al. (2011) minimum variance portfolio 
constructed using JSE largest 100 shares with sector neutrality constraint) 
 High Vol SI Sector Neutral (high volatility portfolio created using a derivation similar 
to Clarke et al. (2011) using JSE largest 100 shares with sector neutrality constraint) 
 Market-cap Wt ALSI100 (market-cap weighted portfolio of the largest 100 JSE 
shares) 
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Figure 4.2.4.1: Cumulative Returns using Top 100 shares with sector neutral constraint 
 
From Figure 4.2.4.1 both the low volatility and high volatility portfolios have 
underperformed the market-cap weighted portfolio. This can partially be explained by the 
fact that the imposition of sector constraints may distort the low volatility anomaly as was 
discussed in the previous section. More importantly, the low volatility portfolio has 
outperformed the high volatility portfolio (albeit with a small margin) out-of-period. In 
international literature the low volatility anomaly is described as the empirical finding that 
low volatility portfolios have been found to outperform high volatility portfolios at a lower 
risk, globally out-of-period. Thus the observed low volatility outperformance relative to the 
high volatility portfolio in this sector-neutral setting provides further evidence that the low 
volatility anomaly in the South African market cannot be attributed to merely a sector 
effect. As such it can be concluded that the low volatility anomaly is present in the South 
African market and is widespread within sectors, consistent with the findings of Baker et al. 
(2014) in the U.S. market. 
In Table 4.2.4.1 below the statistical significance of this outperformance is tested using the 
market model regression as was defined in equation (9). The aim of this regression is to 
determine if the low volatility portfolio has a statistically significant positive alpha relative to 
the high volatility portfolio out-of-period in this sector-neutral setting. 
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Table 4.2.4.1: ANOVA table obtained from Low – High Vol portfolio market model 
regression with sector neutrality constraint (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
The market model regression in Table 4.2.4.1 has explained 34% of the variation in the low 
volatility outperformance relative to the high volatility portfolio. While this R-squared is low, 
the statistically significant F-statistic with a p-value of 0% implies that the regression is 
statistically significant and can be relied upon. After including a sector neutrality constraint 
on the portfolios, the beta of the low volatility portfolio is statistically significantly (p-value 
of 0%) less that of the high volatility portfolio by 0.43, out-of-period. The low volatility 
portfolio has a statistically significant (i.e. p-value of 4%) positive alpha of 0.61% relative to 
the high volatility portfolio out-of-period.  
From the analysis in the above sections it can be concluded that the Property, FINDI vs. RESI 
sector effects have had a statistically significant effect on the low beta anomaly in the South 
African setting. However, when these sector effects were excluded from the portfolios (i.e. 
analysis excluding Property and RESI shares and the sector-neutral portfolios) the low 
volatility portfolio outperformance over the high volatility portfolio was found to have 
persisted and the low volatility portfolios were found to have had a statistically significant 
positive alpha relative to the high volatility portfolios out-of-period. In fact it can be 
concluded, consistent with Baker et al. (2014) and Asness, Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), 
that the low volatility effect (i.e. low volatility vs. high volatility portfolios) in the South 
African setting has been statistically significant at the stock selection level within sectors 
out-of-period. These results would suggest that the security market line in the South African 
market is flatter than is implied by the CAPM, consistent with Black (1972).  
  
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 58%
R Square 34%
Adjusted R Square 33%
Standard Error 3.23
Observations 128
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 671.33 671.33 64.31 0%
Residual 126 1 315.40 10.44
Total 127 1 986.74
Coefficients
Standard 
Error
t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Net Alpha  (Low - High Vol) 0.61 0.30 2.06 4% 0.03 1.19 0.03 1.19
Net Beta (Low - High Vol) -0.43 0.05 -8.02 0% -0.54 -0.33 -0.54 -0.33
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4.2.5. Analysing the effect of the imposition of sector constraints on the low 
volatility anomaly in the South African market 
 
In the previous section sector constraints were imposed on the portfolios to investigate if 
the low volatility anomaly has been merely as a result of a sector effect or if it has been 
widespread across the JSE sectors. In this section an in-depth analysis is performed on the 
portfolios before and after the imposition of sector constraints. This analysis will help 
determine the impact of the imposition of sector constraints on the low volatility vs. high 
volatility portfolio characteristics. 
Effect of sector constraints on portfolio composition 
To investigate the impact of the imposition of sector constraints on the portfolio 
compositions the active share as introduced by Petajisto (2013) is used; where active share 
is defined as follows: 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 =
1
2
∑|𝑤𝑖,𝐴 − 𝑤𝑖,𝐵|
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                         (14) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑛 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝐴 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵 
𝑤𝑖,𝐴 = 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝐴 
𝑤𝑖,𝐵 = 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝐵 
Essentially, the active share measures the absolute distance between two portfolios. In this 
setting the active share will be used to measure the distance between the sector-
unconstrained portfolios vs. the portfolios excluding Property shares vs. the portfolios 
excluding Property and RESI shares. The aim is to understand the impact of imposing sector 
constraints on the composition of the low and high volatility portfolios. If the active share 
between the portfolios with and without sector constraints is found to be low, it would 
imply that the imposition of sector constraints has not had a material impact in altering the 
portfolio composition. As such the sector-constrained low and high volatility portfolios are 
still good approximations of the low and high volatility portfolios. Thus, the interpretation of 
the low volatility anomaly may still be relevant. However, if the active share resulting from 
the imposition of sector constraints is large; it would imply that the sector-constrained low 
and high volatility portfolios are very different to the sector-unconstrained low and high 
volatility portfolios. As such the interpretation of the low volatility and high volatility 
portfolio characteristics may not be an accurate reflection on the low volatility anomaly in 
that case. 
Figure 4.2.5.1 below depicts the active share over time of the low and high volatility 
portfolios as follows: 
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 Solid blue and green lines: depict the active share of the low and high volatility 
portfolios after excluding Listed Property shares (i.e. distance between the low and 
high volatility portfolios before and after the Property constraint). 
 Dotted blue and green lines – depict the additional active share of the low and high 
volatility portfolios after excluding Property and RESI shares (i.e. distance between 
the low and high volatility portfolios after the exclusion of Property and RESI shares 
vs. exclusion of Property shares only) 
 
Figure 4.2.5.1: Active Share of the low and high portfolios after the imposition of sector 
constraints 
 
From Figure 4.2.5.1 above it is evident that the exclusion of the Listed Property stocks has 
had a material impact on the composition of the low and high volatility portfolios. In 
particular, the imposition of this constraint (as depicted by the solid blue line in Figure 
4.2.5.1) has resulted in an active share of at least 25%. This effectively implies that the 
exclusion of Property shares from the investable universe has resulted in at least a quarter 
of the stocks in the low volatility portfolio being substituted with stocks from a higher beta 
sector. In addition, the exclusion of the RESI shares from the investable universe also 
induces a further change in the low volatility portfolio composition (as depicted by the 
dotted blue line in Figure 4.2.5.1). This implies that the imposition of sector constraints has 
a material impact on the composition of the low volatility portfolio. As such the constraint 
on sector allocations may materially distort the interpretation of the low volatility anomaly 
in the South African market. This material imposition of sector constraints may explain the 
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observed underperformance of the low volatility portfolio relative to the market-cap 
weighted benchmark for the sector-neutral and Property & RESI sector-constrained 
portfolios.  
Effect of sector constraints on out-of-period portfolio return characteristics 
Blitz and van Vliet (2014) argue that low volatility stocks tend to outperform in sharply 
falling markets (e.g. 2008) and underperform in strongly rising markets (e.g. 2009). The 
outperformance from low volatility portfolios in falling markets is due to the fact these 
portfolios tend to fall to a lesser extent relative to high volatility portfolios in this market 
environment. Blitz and van Vliet (2014) show that from a global equity perspective; on 
average the low volatility portfolio outperformed the market-cap weighted benchmark in 
the case where the benchmark return was negative and in the case where the benchmark 
return was between 0% and 15%. On the other hand, when the 1 year benchmark return 
was greater than 15%; they showed that the low volatility portfolio underperformed the 
market-cap weighted benchmark. 
Figure 4.2.5.2 depicts the average 1 year return of the low volatility, high volatility and 
market-cap weighted portfolios in the South African market during periods when the 
market-cap weighted benchmark delivered a 1 year return that is: 
 Less than 0% (i.e. negative) 
 Between 0% and 15% 
 Greater than 15% 
 
In Figure 4.2.5.2 the conditional 1 year returns have been partitioned into the following: 
i. Panel A: Portfolios constructed using ALSI100 universe 
ii. Panel B: Portfolios constructed using ALSI100 excluding Property shares 
iii. Panel C: Portfolios constructed using ALSI100 excluding Property and RESI shares 
iv. Panel D: Sector-neutral portfolios constructed using ALSI100 universe 
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Figure 4.2.5.2: Average 1 Year Portfolio Returns in varying market environments 
(December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
From a South African perspective, Figure 4.2.5.2 above is consistent with the findings of Blitz 
and van Vliet (2014). On average the low volatility portfolios have outperformed the high 
volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios when the 1 year market return has been 
negative or between 0% and 15%. During periods when the market return was in excess of 
15% the low volatility portfolios underperformed both the high volatility and market-cap 
weighted portfolios consistent with Blitz and van Vliet (2014). Figure 4.2.5.2 also highlights 
the effects of the imposition of sector constraints on the out-of-period portfolio 
characteristics as shown below: 
a. The exclusion of Property shares (Panel A vs. Panel B) has not had a material impact 
on the conditional returns of the low and high volatility portfolios relative to the 
market-cap weighted benchmark. 
b. The exclusion of Property and RESI shares (Panel C vs. Panel A & B) has had a 
material impact on the conditional returns of the low volatility portfolio. The 
imposition of this sector constraint has resulted in the performance being 
considerably worsened in negative markets (from +9.9% to -0.8%) while the 
performance of the high volatility and market-cap weighted portfolio has not been 
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materially affected in this market environment. This may explain the observed 
underperformance of the low volatility portfolio relative to the market-cap weighted 
portfolio when this sector constraint was imposed. 
c. Similarly, the imposition of the sector-neutrality constraint (Panel D vs. Panel A & B) 
has also had a material impact on the out-of-period conditional portfolio returns. 
Again, the performance of the low volatility portfolio is worsened considerably in 
negative markets (-1.9% vs. 9.9%) relative to the high volatility and market-cap 
weighted portfolios. This may explain the observed underperformance of the low 
volatility portfolio relative to the market-cap weighted portfolio in this sector-neutral 
environment. 
 
Given that low volatility stocks tend to have smaller drawdowns than high volatility 
portfolios it can be expected that they recover more quickly from losses (see Blitz and van 
Vliet (2014) and Papathanakos and Musolf (2014)). The quicker recovery rate can be 
attributed to the asymmetry of the required return to break-even after experiencing a 
drawdown. This can be demonstrated using Siegel’s paradox which was introduced in the 
foreign exchange market. In the low volatility vs. high volatility drawdown setting it would 
translate to the fact that the required positive return (to break-even) from a drawdown is 
higher than the negative return experienced in the drawdown. This is demonstrated in the 
example in Table 4.2.5.1 below: 
Table 4.2.5.1: Drawdown vs. Required Return to break-even 
 
From Table 4.2.5.1 it is evident that for every level of drawdown experienced the required 
positive return to break-even is always greater than the drawdown experienced. For 
example if one experiences a drawdown of -50%; then one requires a positive return of 
100% to break-even. Given that low volatility portfolios tend to experience lower 
drawdowns than high volatility portfolios (see Blitz and van Vliet (2014) and Papathanakos 
and Musolf (2014)), it would imply that the subsequent burden on low volatility portfolios to 
break-even is considerably smaller than that of the high volatility portfolios. As such, it 
would make sense that low volatility portfolios would recover more quickly from losses (to 
break-even) than high volatility portfolios. 
Given their lower drawdowns (Figure 4.2.5.2), the low volatility portfolios would have a 
lower required return to break-even than the high volatility and market-cap weighted 
portfolios. Figure 4.2.5.3 below depicts the maximum drawdowns experienced by portfolios 
constructed in the South African setting and the required return to break-even after 
suffering the drawdown.  
  
Drawdown Experienced -10% -20% -30% -40% -50% -60% -70% -80% -90%
Required Return to Break-even 11% 25% 43% 67% 100% 150% 233% 400% 900%
Drawdown Experienced vs. Required Return to Break-even
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Figure 4.2.5.3: Maximum Drawdown experienced vs. Required Break-even return 
(December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
It is evident from Figure 4.2.5.3 that the low volatility portfolios have had smaller maximum 
drawdowns than the high volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios in the South African 
market out-of-period. As a result these portfolios have required a considerably lower 
positive return to break-even than the high volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios. 
On the other hand the maximum drawdown experienced by the high volatility portfolios has 
been larger than that experienced by the market-cap weighted portfolios. As a result these 
portfolios have required a considerably larger return to break-even than both the low 
volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios. By imposing sector-neutrality the drawdown 
characteristics of the low volatility portfolio is worsened quite considerably as is evident in 
Figure 4.2.5.3 (last block on the right). As a result, the maximum drawdown of the sector-
neutral low volatility portfolio is close to that of the market cap weighted portfolio (i.e. 35% 
vs. 40%).  As such the required return to break-even for the sector-neutral low volatility 
portfolio is 54% which is materially higher than the other low volatility portfolios which 
ranged from 36% to 38%. This may explain why this portfolio underperformed the market-
cap weighted portfolio. 
Given the higher required return burden (to break-even) on the high volatility and market-
cap weighted portfolios one would expect the low volatility portfolios to recover quicker. In 
Figure 4.2.5.4 below the maximum drawdown of the portfolios are depicted against the 
period it took to recover from the drawdown experienced. This will help establish if in fact 
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the smaller drawdowns experienced by low volatility portfolios have resulted in quicker 
recovery periods in the South African market. 
Figure 4.2.5.4: Maximum Drawdown vs. Period it took to Break-even (December 2003 – 
August 2014) 
 
From Figure 4.2.5.4 it is evident that the low volatility portfolios have recovered more 
quickly from the maximum drawdowns experienced than the high volatility and market-cap 
weighted portfolios in the South African market. This finding is consistent with international 
literature (see Blitz and van Vliet (2014) and Papathanakos and Musolf (2014)). Imposing 
sector-neutrality worsens the drawdown characteristic of the low volatility portfolio as it 
takes longer for this portfolio to recover from the maximum drawdown than the market-cap 
weighted portfolio and some high volatility portfolios. The above findings are consistent 
with international literature which argued that the low volatility effect can be explained by 
the fact that low volatility portfolios tend to have lower drawdowns than high volatility 
portfolios and recover from these more quickly. 
Blitz and van Vliet (2014) showed that the compounding of returns over longer time 
horizons reduces this potential for underperformance in falling markets. In other words, if 
the investment period is lengthened then the probability of the low volatility portfolio 
underperforming in falling markets is materially reduced. Table 4.2.5.2 below depicts the 
probability of the low and high volatility portfolios underperforming the market-cap 
weighted portfolio over different investment horizons in the South African market.  
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Table 4.2.5.2: Probability of underperformance during down markets (December 2003 – 
August 2014) 
 
While the low volatility portfolios have on average outperformed the high volatility 
portfolios in falling markets as can be seen in Table 4.2.5.2, there is a meaningful probability 
of the low volatility portfolio underperforming in falling markets. Importantly, this 
probability is reduced if the investment horizon is lengthened. On the other hand, 
lengthening the investment horizon increases the probability of the high volatility portfolios 
underperforming the market-cap weighted benchmarks in falling markets. Thus, lengthening 
the investment period allows for compounding to take effect and the risk characteristics of 
the low and high volatility portfolios become more pronounced. This is consistent with the 
findings of Baker et al. (2011) who argued that the characteristics of low volatility portfolios 
are more pronounced when looking at compound returns. From Table 4.2.5.2 it is also 
evident that imposing sector constraints on the portfolios materially worsens the low 
volatility portfolio performance in falling markets. For instance, imposing sector-neutrality 
increases the probability of underperformance in falling markets from 4% to 28% over 36 
month periods. This material change in the out-of-period portfolio characteristics (after the 
imposition of sector constraints) may explain the underperformance of the low volatility 
portfolio relative to the market-cap weighted portfolio in the case where Property and RESI 
shares are excluded from the investable universe and the sector-neutral case. 
From this section it can be concluded that low volatility portfolios do tend to outperform 
high volatility and market-cap portfolios in falling markets. The smaller losses experienced 
by the low volatility portfolios imply that the positive return required to break-even is 
considerably lower for low volatility portfolios; as such they recover more quickly from 
losses as has been evidenced. However, it is important to note the short-term risk of 
potential underperformance in falling markets as noted by Blitz and van Vliet (2014). The 
imposition of sector constraints exacerbates this risk as shown in Table 4.2.5.2. The risk of 
the low volatility portfolio underperforming in falling markets is reduced if the investment 
period is lengthened as compounding takes effect as shown by Blitz and van Vliet (2014). 
Thus far the impact of the imposition of sector constraints at the portfolio construction level 
has been analysed from a portfolio composition and drawdown perspective. In the ensuing 
Probability of Underperformance in 
Falling Markets
1 Month 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months 36 Months
Low Vol SI Model 21% 16% 13% 9% 3%
Low Vol SI Model ex Property 21% 17% 14% 9% 4%
Low Vol SI Model ex Property & RESI 26% 26% 27% 22% 18%
Sector Neutral Low Vol SI Model 33% 31% 33% 32% 28%
High Vol SI Model 47% 61% 65% 72% 84%
High Vol SI Model ex Property 58% 64% 68% 75% 87%
High Vol SI Model ex Property & RESI 62% 62% 65% 74% 86%
Sector Neutral High Vol SI 65% 76% 82% 90% 98%
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section the out-of-period risks of the portfolios (before and after the imposition of sector 
constraints) are analysed using the covariance bi-plot. 
4.2.6. Using the covariance bi-plot to analyse the out-of-period risk 
characteristics of the portfolios before and after the imposition of 
sector constraints 
 
The covariance bi-plot as was introduced by Barr et al. (1990) will be used in this setting to 
assess the out-of-period risk characteristics of the low volatility vs. high volatility portfolios 
simultaneously (before and after the imposition of sector constraints). 
Figure 4.2.6.1: Covariance bi-plot of the low vs. high volatility portfolios 
(December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
From the covariance bi-plot in Figure 4.2.6.1: 
 The low volatility portfolios have preserved their low volatility characteristics out-of-
period; having lower beta and volatility than the high volatility portfolios. 
 Before the RESI shares were excluded from the analysis the high volatility portfolios 
were positioned close to the RESI index, consistent with the overweight RESI position 
inherent in these portfolios. 
 There is a low correlation between the low volatility portfolios and the high volatility 
portfolios before the exclusion of RESI shares from the analysis (i.e. the angle 
between the lines connecting Cash and these portfolios is close to 90 degrees 
implying very low correlation). 
62 
 
 After excluding RESI shares from the analysis there is a high correlation between the 
low and high volatility portfolios (i.e. the angle between the lines connecting Cash 
and these portfolios is close to 90 degrees implying very low correlation), indicating 
that the risk characteristics between these portfolios were no longer very distinct. 
 By imposing sector neutrality on the low volatility portfolio, the beta of the low 
volatility portfolio increases from 0.4 up to 0.7. However, the sector neutral low 
volatility portfolio is very distinct from the sector neutral high volatility portfolio as is 
depicted by the positioning of these portfolios on the covariance bi-plot. 
 The sector neutral high volatility portfolio is positioned very close to the other high 
volatility portfolios, indicating that adding sector neutrality as a constraint has not 
materially changed the risk characteristics of this portfolio. 
 
All in all the exclusion of the Property and RESI shares from the investable universe and the 
imposition of the sector-neutrality constraint has resulted in materially different out-of-
period risk characteristics for the low volatility vs. high volatility portfolios in the South 
African market. In addition, the active share showed that the imposition of these sector 
constraints resulted in low vs. high volatility portfolios that were materially different to the 
portfolios without sector constraints. Also, the imposition of sector constraints had a 
material impact on the out-of-period portfolio return characteristics. These material 
differences in the portfolio characteristics may explain the underperformance of the low 
volatility portfolio relative to the market-cap weighted portfolio after the imposition of the 
Property & RESI and sector-neutrality constraints on the portfolios. More importantly, the 
low volatility portfolio outperformed the high volatility portfolio before and after the 
imposition of sector constraints. From this it can be concluded that the low volatility 
anomaly is prevalent in the South African market and is widespread within sectors as 
opposed to it being merely a sector effect, consistent with Baker et al. (2014). 
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4.3. Summary Findings on the Low Volatility Back-test in the South 
African market 
 
The Clarke et al. (2011) low volatility portfolio construction methodology was selected as 
the appropriate methodology for the purposes of this thesis. This choice was made as a 
result of the methodology’s proximity to the CAPM and its improvements relative to the 
GMV portfolio. As such the back-test was run using this low volatility portfolio construction 
methodology.  
The low volatility portfolio outperformed the market-cap weighted and high volatility 
portfolios in the South African market out-of-period, with a statistically significant (p-value 
1%) out-of-period monthly alpha of 0.84%. Upon closer inspection the Listed Property and 
FINDI vs. RESI sector effects were detected as statistically significant at explaining the low 
volatility anomaly in the South African market. To investigate whether the low volatility 
anomaly is merely a result of these sector effects or if it is widespread across the JSE 
sectors, constraints were imposed on the sector composition within the low and high 
volatility portfolios.  
The exclusion of both the Listed Property and RESI shares from the investable universe and 
the imposition of the sector-neutrality constraint resulted in the low volatility portfolio 
underperforming the market-cap weighted portfolio out-of-period. The imposition of these 
sector constraints was shown to have a material impact on the composition of the low and 
high volatility portfolios using the active share. In addition, these sector constraints were 
also shown to have materially changed the out-of-period risk and drawdown characteristics 
of the low and high volatility portfolios. This material distortion of the low volatility portfolio 
characteristics may explain the observed underperformance of this portfolio relative to the 
market-cap weighted portfolios.  
More importantly, the low volatility portfolio outperformance relative to the high volatility 
portfolio was still prevalent after the imposition of sector constraints. Based on these 
findings it can be concluded that in the South African setting the Property and FINDI vs. RESI 
sector effects are significant factors in explaining the low volatility anomaly. However, it can 
also be concluded that the low volatility anomaly cannot be attributed to only a Listed 
Property or FINDI vs. RESI sector effects. This can be evidenced by the fact that the low 
volatility portfolios outperformed the high volatility portfolios with statistically significant 
positive out-of-period alphas after imposing the sector neutrality constraint and excluding 
both the Listed Property and RESI shares from the investable universe. Thus it is concluded 
that the low volatility effect is prevalent and statistically significant in the South African 
market within industries, consistent with the findings of Baker et al. (2014) and Asness et al. 
(2014) in the U.S. market. 
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5. Understanding the low volatility anomaly in the South African 
Equity market 
 
From the back-test results in the previous section, low volatility portfolios have 
outperformed their high volatility counterparts, while preserving their low volatility 
characteristics out-of-period in the South African setting. From the statistical tests 
performed on these, the conclusion is that the outperformance cannot be attributed to only 
a sector effect. The sector-neutral low volatility portfolio constructed using the largest 100 
JSE share universe still produced a positive monthly alpha of 0.61% over the high volatility 
portfolio with a p-value of 4% out-of-period. This is consistent with the findings of Baker et 
al. (2014) and Asness et al. (2014) in the U.S. market who found the low volatility effect to 
be more pronounced at the stock selection level within industries and countries than across 
industries or countries. 
Yamada and Nagawatari (2010) argue that the price volatility of a stock should reflect the 
underlying expected earnings variability. As such the sector effect would be driven by the 
underlying sector expected earnings variability. This would imply that sectors with low or 
high variability in their expected earnings would, by construction, have overweight positions 
in the low or high volatility portfolios respectively. The imposition of sector constraints 
forces the low or high volatility portfolios to allocate to some sectors that they otherwise 
would not have allocated to. This in turn may result in some of the low or high volatility 
characteristics being lost because of the constraints. Thus, the analysis of the sector-neutral 
portfolios may not necessarily be a true test of the low volatility anomaly. On the other 
hand it was shown that the exclusion of Property stocks from the investment universe did 
not have a material impact on the out-of-period risk and return characteristics of the low 
and high volatility portfolios. It was concluded that the low and high volatility portfolios 
constructed with this constraint were still fairly good approximations of the low and high 
volatility portfolios with no sector constraints. Thus, the portfolios that will be used in the 
upcoming sections will be the ones where Listed Property stocks have been excluded from 
the investment universe. 
The aim of this section is to try and explain the low volatility anomaly following international 
literature. A further aim is to determine if empirical evidence in the South African market 
supports the explanations given for the low volatility anomaly in international literature. The 
explanations for the low volatility anomaly that will be investigated in this thesis in the 
South African market are listed below: 
1. Benchmarking as a limit to arbitrage (Baker et al. (2011)) 
2. Manager Compensation and Agency issues between investment managers and their 
clients (Baker and Haugen (2012)) 
3. Agency issues amongst investment professionals (Baker and Haugen (2012) 
4. Analysts’ Earnings Growth Forecast Bias (Hsu, Kudoh and Yamada (2013)) 
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5. Investor overconfidence in growth forecasts for stocks with high earnings variability 
(Yamada and Nagawatari (2010), Hsu et al. (2013) and Dichev and Tang (2010)) 
6. Investor Preference for lotteries (Baker et al. (2011) 
 
In this chapter the above-listed potential causes of the low volatility effect will be laid out 
and an attempt will be made to find evidence of them (if any) in the South African market. 
5.1. Effect of Benchmarking as a limit to arbitrage 
 
Baker, Bradley and Wurgler (2011) argue that benchmarking exacerbates the low volatility 
anomaly from a portfolio construction perspective. They argue that the reason institutional 
investors are not overweight low volatility stocks is a result of the benchmarking. Typically 
institutional managers are mandated to maximise the information ratio relative to a market-
cap weighted benchmark, where the information ratio is defined as follows: 
𝐼𝑅𝑝 =
𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑏
𝑇𝐸𝑝,𝑏
                                                                                     (15)      
where 𝐼𝑅𝑝 = information ratio of 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑃 
𝑅𝑝 = return of 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑃  
𝑅𝑏 = return of 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝐵  
𝑇𝐸𝑝,𝑏 = tracking error of 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑃 relative to 𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘 𝐵     
The investment manager is expected to maximise the information ratio through stock 
selection and without using leverage. Using information ratio is appealing because it makes 
it easy to assess the stock selection skill (i.e. numerator of equation (15)) of the investment 
manager relative to the relative risk taken to achieve the outperformance (denominator of 
equation (15)). However, an investment manager mandated to maximise the information 
ratio is less likely to exploit the low volatility anomaly all else equal as low volatility stocks 
will typically increase their tracking error to the market-cap weighted benchmark. 
If there is extra demand for high volatility stocks, this should push up the price of higher risk 
stocks and thus decrease the subsequent returns and vice versa for low risk stocks. 
However, an institutional investor with a fixed benchmark is unlikely to exploit these 
mispricings. In fact, Baker et al. (2011) demonstrate that the manager is more likely to 
exacerbate the problem as shown in the example that follows. 
The Security Characteristic Line (SCL) for security j (j=1, 2,…, N) is of the form: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑗,𝑡) = 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛼𝑗                              (16)  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐸(𝑅𝑗,𝑡) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 of stock j at time t 
𝛼𝑗 =  𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑗 relative to the market index  
𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 rate at time t 
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𝛽𝑗 = 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑎 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑗 to the market index   
𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 at time t 
From equation (16) it can then be shown that the expected outperformance for a stock j can 
be deduced as follows: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑗,𝑡) − 𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡)
= 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛼𝑗 − {𝑅𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛼𝑚𝑘𝑡} 
= 𝛽𝑗𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛼𝑗 − {𝟏 × 𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝟎} 
= (𝛽𝑗 − 1)𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝛼𝑗                                                 (17) 
From equation (17) it can then be shown that overweighting the stock by 𝜋𝑗 will increase 
the expected active return (relative to the benchmark) of the portfolio by approximately: 
∆𝐸(𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡) = 𝜋𝑗{(𝛽𝑗 − 1)𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛼𝑗}                                          (18)    
Now suppose that: 
 𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓) = 10%  
 beta of 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐴 = 𝛽𝐴 = 0.75 
 beta of 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐵 = 𝛽𝐵 = 1.25 
 Market Volatility = 𝜎𝑚𝑘𝑡 = 20% 
 
From (18) it follows that overweighting the low beta stock A can be expected to increase the 
portfolio relative return by approximately: 
∆𝐸(𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡) = 𝜋𝐴{(𝛽𝐴 − 1)𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛼𝐴)} = 𝜋(−2.5% + 𝛼𝐴)        (19)   
From equation (19) it follows that unless the expected alpha of stock A is at least 2.5% 
relative to the benchmark, overweighting this stock will reduce the overall portfolio relative 
return. For instance, even if stock A had a healthy expected alpha of 2% relative to the 
benchmark; overweighting this stock will decrease the expected portfolio excess return by a 
factor of 0.5% multiplied by the overweight position. Thus, this stock would only be a 
candidate for an overweight position only if its expected alpha is higher than 2.5%. As such a 
manager who is mandated to maximise information ratio would not include this stock in 
their portfolio unless its expected alpha was at least 2.5%. Thus, by construction lower beta 
stocks are more likely to be candidates for underweight positions rather than overweight 
positions. 
On the other hand the following can be deduced for the high beta stock B: 
∆𝐸(𝑅𝑝 − 𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡) = 𝜋𝐵{(𝛽𝐵 − 1)(𝑅𝑚𝑘𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛼𝐵} = 𝜋𝐵(2.5% + 𝛼𝐵)             (20) 
67 
 
This derivation shows that stock B will always be a candidate for an overweight position 
unless it’s expected alpha fell below -2.5%. In other words, if stock B has an undesirable 
expected alpha of -2.0% it would still be a candidate for an overweight position in the 
portfolio simply because of its high alpha. 
The above example also shows that even if stock A has the same expected alpha as stock B 
(say 2%), the manager is compelled to choose stock B from a portfolio construction 
perspective. This is consistent with the findings of Brennan (1993) and Brennan and Li 
(2008).  This further suggests that benchmarking creates demand for the high volatility 
stocks and would make these stocks to be priced at a premium relative to low volatility 
stocks. 
In the above section it has been shown, following Baker et al. (2011) that from a portfolio 
construction perspective a manager who aims to increase their ex-ante information ratio 
would demand a higher expected alpha from a low beta stock than a high beta stock. This 
finding by Baker et al. (2011) concluded that benchmarking exacerbates the low beta 
anomaly precisely because of the demonstration above. 
The following section examines the findings of Baker and Haugen (2012) in the South African 
market. They argued that manager compensation and agency issues between investment 
managers and their clients (including benchmarking) add to the low beta anomaly. 
 
5.2. Effect of Manager Compensation & Agency issues between 
investment managers and their clients on the low volatility anomaly 
Baker and Haugen (2012) argued that manager compensation and agency issues between 
investment managers and their clients add to the low volatility anomaly. In particular they 
argued that the nature of manager compensation where an investment manager is paid a 
performance bonus if performance is above a given threshold benchmark exacerbates the 
low volatility anomaly. Baker and Haugen (2012) argued that an investment manager would 
increase their probability of achieving the performance threshold if they are invested in high 
volatility stocks. This argument is inter-linked with the argument of Baker et al. (2011) who 
argued that from a portfolio construction perspective investment managers would be 
inherently drawn to high volatility stocks (relative to low volatility stocks) if they are 
measured against a market benchmark. Together these arguments suggest that 
benchmarking creates excess demand for high volatility stocks which make them overpriced 
relative to low volatility stocks; which in turn would lead to lower subsequent returns for 
high volatility stocks relative to low volatility stocks. 
Figure 5.2.1, sourced from the above-mentioned paper, is a depiction of how manager 
compensation can affect how an investment manager picks stocks depending on their 
compensation. 
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Figure 5.2.1: Option-like Manager Compensation (Baker & Haugen (2012)) 
 
 
The red line in Figure 5.2.1 depicts a hypothetical schedule of manager compensation where 
a manager is paid a base salary and then a bonus if performance is above a certain 
threshold. The green and the blue lines depict a hypothetical return distribution for a high 
and low volatility portfolio respectively. Comparing the return distributions of the low and 
high volatility portfolios it is evident that the low volatility portfolio has much less downside 
risk than the high volatility portfolio. However, the upside potential return of the low 
volatility portfolio is also much less than the high volatility portfolio.  
From Figure 5.2.1 it is evident that an investment manager would maximise the probability 
of earning a bonus if they are invested in the high volatility portfolio rather than the low 
volatility portfolio. Blitz, Falkenstein and van Vliet (2014) argue that this incentive structure 
resembles a call option as the payoff for the investment manager can be depicted as: 
𝑀𝑃𝑡 = 𝑐 + max(𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑋, 0)                                                     (21) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑀𝑃𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝑐 = 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑓𝑒𝑒 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 = 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 at time t 
𝑋 = ℎ𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑙𝑒 above − which manager receives 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 
Blitz et al. (2014) and Baker and Haugen (2012) argue that this agency issue between 
investment managers and their clients implies that the investment manager would have a 
preference for the high volatility portfolio as this would increase their probability of earning 
a performance bonus. This would imply more demand for high volatility stocks, implying 
that these would be priced at a premium relative to low volatility stocks. 
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Figure 5.2.2 below depicts the 3 month return distribution of the low volatility and high 
volatility portfolios in the South African market. Given that these are 3 month returns, they 
would only be an approximation of the long-term portfolio return distribution as they do 
not take into account the compounding effect. 
Figure 5.2.2: 3 Month Absolute Return Distribution in the South African market 
(December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
The return distribution in Figure 5.2.2 of the low and high volatility portfolios is roughly 
consistent with that shown in Figure 5.2.1. In the South African setting, the high volatility 
portfolio has had significantly higher upside potential return than the low volatility portfolio. 
This portfolio has also shown slightly more upside potential than the market-cap weighted 
portfolio which would typically be the benchmark portfolio. On the other hand, the low 
volatility portfolio has shown very little upside return potential relative to both the market-
cap weighted benchmark and the high volatility portfolio. On the downside; however, the 
low volatility portfolio has displayed materially better risk characteristics than both the 
market-cap weighted and the high volatility portfolio. However, an investment manager 
whose skill is measured on a relative basis would focus more on the relative performance 
(i.e. relative to the mandated market-cap weighted benchmark) rather than the absolute 
return distribution.  
In general a fund manager is mandated to outperform a market benchmark as was shown in 
the previous section, consistent with Baker et al. (2011). Figure 5.2.3 below depicts the 
cumulative probability distribution of the 3 month relative outperformance of the portfolios 
relative to the market-cap weighted benchmark in the South African market. 
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Figure 5.2.3: 3 Month Relative Return Cumulative Probability Distribution (December 2003 
– August 2014) 
 
From Figure 5.2.3 it is evident that the low volatility portfolio has better upside relative 
return potential than the high volatility portfolio. However, the downside relative risk of this 
portfolio is significantly higher than the high volatility portfolio. For instance, there is a 10% 
probability of this portfolio underperforming the market-cap weighted benchmark by +/-
10% on a 3 month basis. These downside relative risk characteristics of the low volatility 
portfolio may be undesirable for an investment manager whose compensation is dependent 
on their performance relative to the market-cap weighted benchmark.  
By construction, an investment manager who is mandated to outperform or maximise the 
information ratio relative to the market-cap weighted benchmark would prefer the high 
volatility portfolio over the low volatility portfolio. While this portfolio has a higher 
probability of underperforming the market-cap weighted portfolio than the low volatility 
portfolio (i.e. 60% vs. 50%), the magnitude of underperformance is significantly lower. 
Secondly, the return distribution of this portfolio is much closer to that of the market-cap 
weighted benchmark than the low volatility portfolio. In other words, an investment 
manager mandated to outperform relative to a market-cap weighted benchmark would (by 
default) forgo the appealing absolute risk-return characteristics of the low volatility portfolio 
in favour of the relative risk-return characteristics of the high volatility portfolio. This would 
support the view of an agency problem existing between the investment managers and 
their clients as shown by Baker and Haugen (2012). In addition, this would also support the 
view of Baker et al. (2011) that benchmark constraints and arbitrage limits also contribute 
to exacerbate the low volatility anomaly. Given that Figure 5.2.2 and 4.2.3 show short term 
return distributions (i.e. 3 months) they fail to take into consideration the compounding 
effects. Baker et al. (2011) note that the advantage of low risk portfolios (relative to high 
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risk portfolios) is more pronounced when displayed in compound returns rather than 
average returns. To demonstrate this Figure 5.2.4 depicts the 60 month return distribution 
of these portfolios. 
Figure 5.2.4: 5 Year Return Distribution (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
Extending the period to 5 years (as shown in Figure 5.2.4) allows for compounding to take 
effect. As such it can be seen that the low volatility portfolio is still very unlikely to yield 
extremely high returns. However, the likelihood of the high volatility and market-cap 
weighted portfolios achieving these returns is also reduced significantly but is still higher 
than the low volatility portfolio, albeit marginally. On the upside, the high volatility portfolio 
is more likely to earn an investment manager a performance bonus above a certain 
threshold than the low volatility portfolio. 
Figure 5.2.5 shows the cumulative probability over the 5 year relative returns (relative to 
the market-cap weighted benchmark) of the low and high volatility portfolios. The appealing 
feature of this chart is that, unlike Figure 5.2.3 (i.e. 3 month chart), the longer investment 
horizon encompasses compounding. 
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Figure 5.2.5: 5 Year Relative Return Cumulative Probability Distribution (December 2003 – 
August 2014) 
 
As a result of compounding, the probability of underperformance is considerably reduced 
for the low volatility portfolio and magnified for the high volatility portfolio. On a 5 year 
basis (Figure 5.2.5) the low volatility portfolio has a 40% probability of underperformance 
while the high volatility portfolio has a probability of 80%. However, the magnitude of the 
underperformance is significantly lower for the high volatility portfolio. For instance, there is 
a 5% probability of the low volatility portfolio underperforming the market-cap weighted 
benchmark by 10% p.a. over 5 years. On the other hand the probability of the high volatility 
portfolio underperforming by 10% p.a. over a 5 year period has been 0%. Clearly, an 
investment manager who is measured against the market-cap weighted benchmark would 
be taking on materially higher downside relative risk if they were invested in the low 
volatility portfolio rather than the high volatility portfolio. This further demonstrates that, 
by construction, benchmarking would induce a demand for high volatility stocks than low 
volatility stocks (as argued by Baker et al. (2011)). 
Extending the investment horizon to 7 years allows for the compounding effect to be more 
pronounced for the low volatility portfolio, in support of Baker et al. (2011) who argued that 
the low volatility effect is more pronounced when one looks at compound returns. 
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Figure 5.2.6: 7 Year Return Distribution (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
From Figure 5.2.6 one could argue that the low volatility portfolio return distribution is 
significantly better that that of the high volatility portfolio. This further supports the 
assertion by Baker et al. (2011) that the advantage of low volatility portfolios relative to the 
high volatility portfolio is greater when displayed in compound returns rather than average 
returns. The assertion that: “low volatility portfolios have lower drawdowns than high 
volatility portfolios and can thus recover more quickly from these than high volatility 
portfolios” is consistent with this finding.  
Figure 5.2.7 below depicts the cumulative probability of outperformance over a 7 year 
investment period of the low and high volatility portfolios. 
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Figure 5.2.7: 7 Year Relative Return Cumulative Distribution (December 2003 – August 
2014) 
 
Figure 5.2.7 is consistent with Figure 5.2.5 (i.e. 5 year relative return distribution). While the 
relative return distribution of the low volatility portfolio may be superior to that of the high 
volatility portfolio, the potential of material underperformance (relative to the market-cap 
weighted benchmark) inherent in this portfolio may be unattractive for an investment 
manager mandated to outperform a market-cap weighted benchmark. Again, this portfolio 
has underperformed the market-cap weighted benchmark with a 40% probability while the 
high volatility portfolio has underperformed with an 85% probability over a 7 year period.  
The above charts demonstrate why an investment manager, who is mandated to 
outperform a market-cap weighted benchmark, may be forced into the underperforming 
high volatility portfolio. Baker and Haugen (2012) argue that this would lead to higher 
demand for high volatility stocks than low volatility stocks. They then argue that this would 
imply that high volatility stocks are priced at a premium relative to low volatility stocks. 
Table 5.2.1: Skewness of outperformance (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
Period
Low Vol SI Model 
ex Property
High Vol SI Model 
ex Property
3 Months -0.18 -0.34
6 Months -0.21 -0.16
12 Months -0.24 0.04
36 Months -0.17 -0.04
60 Months -0.12 -0.03
84 Months -0.11 -0.02
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From Table 5.2.1 it is evident that the outperformance (relative to the market-cap weighted 
benchmark) of low volatility portfolio is more negatively skewed than the high volatility 
portfolio. This implies that the low volatility portfolio has a high probability of 
outperforming the market-cap weighted benchmark; however, there is a small probability of 
this portfolio yielding extreme underperformance relative to the market-cap weighted 
benchmark. An investment manager who is mandated relative to a market-cap weighted  
benchmark may find this feature of low volatility portfolios unappealing. On the other hand 
the outperformance of the high volatility portfolio, especially over longer-periods (i.e. 12 – 
84 months), is not materially negatively skewed relative to the market-cap weighted 
benchmark. This would imply that this portfolio is less likely to yield extreme 
underperformance (relative to the market-cap weighted benchmark) than the low volatility 
portfolio. Thus, a manager would minimise the probability of extreme underperformance if 
they were invested in the high volatility portfolio relative to the low volatility portfolio. 
In the above section the findings in the South African market have been similar to those of 
Baker and Haugen (2012), Baker et al. (2011) and Blitz et al. (2014). They found that 
investment managers who are compensated with a performance fee would maximise the 
probability of achieving the performance fee if they were invested in high volatility stocks 
rather than low volatility stocks. The findings in the above section also showed that from an 
absolute return basis the return characteristics of the low volatility portfolio are appealing 
relative to the high volatility portfolio. However, the relative performance of this portfolio 
(relative to the market-cap weighted benchmark) was found to be more risky than the high 
volatility portfolio. The relative returns of this portfolio (relative to the high volatility 
portfolio) were found to possess significantly more negative skewness. A manager who is 
mandated relative to the market-cap weighted benchmark would be taking on unwanted 
relative risk by investing in the low beta stocks, decreasing their probability of earning a 
performance fee. As such, an active manager would be incentivised to avoid low beta stocks 
and rather invest in high beta stocks to minimise the chances of extreme underperformance 
on their part. This would induce excess demand for high beta stocks leading them to be 
overpriced (relative to low beta stocks), implying lower subsequent returns for these stocks. 
Baker and Haugen (2012) further argue that agency issues amongst investment 
professionals also add to the anomaly. In the following section this argument is tested in the 
South African setting. 
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5.3. Effect of Agency issues amongst investment professionals on the 
anomaly 
Baker and Haugen (2012) further argue that a second agency problem exists amongst 
investment professionals within an organization. Their argument is that within an 
organization periodic investment committee meetings are central to the process of building 
a model portfolio which will serve as a guide for the construction of individual client 
portfolios. During these meetings the analysts, specialising in particular sectors, make a case 
for stocks they believe should be included in the model portfolio. Failing to make their case 
continually could result in stagnation or termination as opposed to career advancement. As 
a consequence, these analysts could be more attracted to stocks for which they can 
confidently make a compelling case. These stocks tend to be noteworthy and receive more 
media coverage; however, they also tend to exhibit higher than average volatility. This then 
implies that higher volatility stocks would be more likely to be included in the model 
portfolio than low volatility stocks. This agency issue would also further imply that high 
volatility stocks are more likely to be priced at a premium relative to low volatility stocks. 
This argument by Baker and Haugen (2012) methodology is tested in the South African 
context following the methodology outlined below. 
Analyst Coverage Methodology: 
The aim in this section is to establish if high volatility stocks receive more analyst coverage 
than low volatility stocks in the South African market. If this is found to be the case; it would 
support the argument of Baker and Haugen (2012) that these stocks are more likely to be 
included in the model portfolio than low volatility stocks and help in explaining the low 
volatility anomaly. To test if this is the case; the back-test was conducted in the South 
African market as shown below. 
Over the period 31 December 2003 to August 2014, at each month-end: 
I. Find the largest 100 JSE listed shares using the All Share weights from the BNP 
Paribas Cadiz database. 
II. Using Bloomberg find the total number of sell-side analysts with “BUY”, “SELL” and 
“HOLD” recommendations on each of these stocks. 
o The total number of “BUY”, “SELL” and “HOLD” recommendations will be 
added up and assumed to be the total sell-side analyst coverage for each 
stock as of that particular month-end. 
III. Calculate the percentage of analysts issuing a “BUY”, “SELL” or “HOLD” 
recommendation on each stock and this will be used as the percentage of “BUY”, 
“SELL” and “HOLD” recommendations out of the total coverage. 
 
77 
 
The average coverage per stock in a portfolio is calculated as follows at each month-end: 
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑝,𝑡 =
∑ 𝐴𝐶 𝑖,𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
                                                                             (22) 
   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑝,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 per stock for 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑃 at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝑛 = total 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 in 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑃 at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
𝐴𝐶 𝑖,𝑡 = total number of 𝐵𝑢𝑦, 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 recommendations for 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖 at 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 
Figure 5.3.1 depicts the average number of sell-side analysts covering a stock in the high and 
low volatility portfolios as well as the market-cap weighted portfolio over the period 
December 2003 to August 2014. 
Figure 5.3.1: Average Analyst Coverage per Stock (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
The stocks in the low volatility portfolio have consistently received less analyst coverage 
than those in the high volatility portfolio. This finding in the South African market is 
consistent with that of Baker and Haugen (2012) who argued that high volatility stocks 
receive more analyst coverage than low volatility stocks. They argue that by virtue of their 
higher analyst coverage, high volatility stocks are more likely to be included in the model 
portfolio than low volatility stocks. They argue that this goes a long way in explaining why 
high volatility stocks could be priced at a premium relative to low volatility stocks. However, 
this is only one side of the equation as it only shows the total coverage and not the analyst 
views (i.e. buy vs. sell vs. hold recommendations). If the higher analyst coverage can be 
found to be accompanied by more optimism for high volatility stocks than low volatility 
stocks; this would support the above argument of Baker and Haugen (2012) from the South 
African perspective. 
Figure 5.3.2 shows the percentage of “Buy” (out of the total number of “Buy”, “Hold” and 
“Sell”) recommendations in the high and low volatility portfolios over the period December 
2003 to August 2014 in the South African setting.  
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Figure 5.3.2: Percentage of BUY Recommendations (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
Evidently, analysts in the South African market have issued more “Buy” recommendations 
for the high volatility portfolio than the low volatility portfolio almost consistently over time. 
Combining Figure 5.3.1 and Figure 5.3.2 shows that there has been more analyst coverage 
per stock for the high volatility portfolio than the low volatility portfolio. Secondly, the 
higher coverage has also been accompanied by a higher percentage of “Buy” 
recommendations. These findings in the South African market strongly support the 
argument put forth by Baker and Haugen (2012) that high volatility stocks are more likely to 
be included in the model portfolio than low volatility stocks. This would imply excess 
demand for high volatility stocks, making them to be priced at a premium relative to low 
volatility stocks. This in turn would lead to lower subsequent returns for high volatility 
stocks, partially explaining the low volatility anomaly. 
Figure 5.3.3 below depicts the percentage of Hold recommendations within the low and 
high volatility portfolios. 
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Figure 5.3.3: Percentage of HOLD Recommendations (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
In the South African market analysts have generally issued more “Hold” recommendations 
for the low volatility portfolio than the high volatility portfolio.  
Figure 5.3.4: Percentage of SELL Recommendations (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
From Figure 5.3.4 analysts in the South African market have issued more “Sell” 
recommendations (fairly consistently over time) for the low volatility portfolio than the high 
volatility portfolio.  
The above charts suggest that analysts have preferred high volatility stocks instead of low 
volatility stocks in the South African market. In addition, they have held more negative 
views on low volatility stocks than high volatility stocks. Baker et al. (2011) argue that stocks 
with more coverage (i.e. analyst, media etc.) will have more optimists among their 
shareholders. Combining these results with Miller (1977) that prices are generally set by 
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optimists it would imply that the high volatility stocks are generally priced at a premium 
relative to low volatility stocks, leading to lower future returns. This is consistent with the 
assertion of Baker and Haugen (2012) that this agency mispricing would mean that high 
volatility stocks are priced at a premium relative to low volatility stocks. 
Thus far it has been shown that there has been more analyst coverage for larger and higher 
beta stocks than for low volatility stocks in the South African market. Baker and Haugen 
(2012) found a strong positive linear relationship between a stock’s analyst coverage and its 
market capitalisation and its volatility. To test this relationship in the South African market 
the following cross-sectional regression analysis is performed over time following Baker and 
Haugen (2012): 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝛾 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 + 𝜏 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑐𝑎𝑝 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
𝐴_𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝛽𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜑                                                                     (23) 
𝐴_𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = total number of 𝐵𝑢𝑦, 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑 recommendations for 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖 at time 𝑡  
𝛽𝑖,𝑡 = beta of 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖 at time 𝑡 to the market cap weighted index 
𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = market cap weight of 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
The aim of this regression analysis is to help determine if a stock’s analyst coverage has a 
significant relationship with its beta and market-cap weight in the South African setting. 
Figure 5.3.5: Regression coefficients for the Stock Beta and ALSI Weight Variables 
 
From Figure 5.3.5 it is evident that the R-squared from the regression analysis has been on a 
decline over time. Historically, the stock’s ALSI weight and its beta have explained 
approximately 60% of the variation in analyst stock coverage; however, this has been on a 
decline and the R-squared was only 30% as of June 2014. All else equal, the average analyst 
coverage per stock has increased over time. As of June 2014 the average analyst coverage 
per stock was 8 analysts, ceteris Paribas. On average the analyst coverage per stock has 
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increased by 2 analysts for every 1% increase in a stock’s weight in the ALSI while the 
analyst coverage per stock has been generally independent of the stock’s beta. Thus, in the 
South African market the stock coverage (by sell-side analysts) has had a positive 
relationship with its weight in the ALSI (i.e. as a stock’s weight in the ALSI increases its 
analyst coverage has also increased); consistent with Baker and Haugen (2012). 
In Figure 5.3.6 below the t-statistics of the above regression coefficients are depicted. 
Figure 5.3.6: Analyst Coverage regression T-statistics (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
From Figure 5.3.6 the weight of a stock in the market-cap weighted index has been a 
significant variable at explaining the analyst coverage. Holding all else constant, stocks with 
a higher weight in the market-cap weighted index have experienced significantly more 
analyst coverage over time. On the other hand the t-statistic for the beta was significant 
(around 2) over the period December 2003 to November 2006 and more recently between 
December 2013 and June 2014. Over the period December 2006 to November 2013 we 
cannot conclude that the relationship between analyst coverage per stock and stock beta 
was different from zero. 
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Figure 5.3.7: Analyst Coverage regression P-values (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
Evidently (Figure 5.3.7) the ALSI weight is significant at the 5% level as shown above. Thus, 
the stock weight in the market-cap weighted benchmark has a significant positive 
relationship to the analyst coverage. On the other hand, the stock beta has not had a 
significant p-value over this period. As such we cannot conclude that there is a significant 
relationship between a stock’s beta and the number of analysts covering it. 
Before concluding that the above holds, it is important to check if any of the multivariate 
linear regression assumptions are violated. If there is a significant correlation between the 
independent variables it could mean that a multi-collinearity problem exists in the 
regression analysis which could distort the results. This problem could result in the standard 
errors being higher than they should be and thus making the t-statistics too small. As a 
result it would mean one is more likely to disregard a relationship that truly exists as not 
being significant. Figure 5.3.8 below depicts the correlation between the two independent 
variables, namely stock beta and market-cap weight. 
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Figure 5.3.8: Correlation between Stock Beta and ALSI Weight (December 2003 – August 
2014) 
 
Figure 5.3.8 shows a consistent positive correlation between a stock’s beta and its weight in 
the market-cap weighted benchmark. The correlation between these two variables has 
averaged 0.28; however, more recently this correlation increased to 0.35 as of June 2014. As 
such, this increase in correlation between the independent variables could potentially 
distort the regression results.  
Given the multi-collinearity potentially inherent in the previous regression analysis, the 
Xiong et al. (2010) methodology may be a better model of identifying if there is a 
relationship between a stock’s analyst coverage and its ALSI weight and beta. Following this 
methodology the analyst coverage for a stock can be decomposed into the following 
components: 
𝐴𝐶 𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑖,𝑡 + (𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑖,𝑡) + (𝛽𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑤𝑖,𝑡)                                                 (24) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐴_𝐶𝑖,𝑡
= total number of 𝐵𝑢𝑦, 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑 recommendations for 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖 at time 𝑡  
𝛽𝑖,𝑡 = beta of 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖 at time 𝑡 to the market − cap weighted index  
𝑤𝑖,𝑡 = market − cap weight of 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖 at time 𝑡 in the market
− cap weighted index 
Figure 5.3.9 depicts the percentage variation in analyst coverage per stock explained by the 
stock’s beta and market-cap weight over time in the South African market. 
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Figure 5.3.9: Variation in Stock Coverage Explained by Market-cap Weight and Stock Beta  
 
From Figure 5.3.9 above it can be concluded that: 
 The market-cap weight has explained at least 30% of the variation in analyst 
coverage per stock over the period December 2003 to August 2014. 
 However, the explanatory power of this variable has been declining over time. This 
could also be as a result of the introduction of the FTSE/ JSE Shareholder Weighted 
index (SWIX) as a benchmark. 
 The beta (net of the market-cap weight) has explained between 4% and 27% of the 
variation in analyst coverage per stock. 
 Together these variables (i.e. stock market-cap weight and beta) have explained 
between 38% and 88% of the variation in analyst coverage per stock over time. 
 However, the explanatory power of these variables has been declining over time. As 
of June 2014 these two variables explained 38% of the total variation in analyst 
coverage per stock in the JSE. 
 
From the above analysis it can be concluded that stocks with a higher weight in the market-
cap weighted index and higher beta have generally received more analyst coverage in the 
South African market. Baker et al. (2011) argue that stocks with more coverage (i.e. analyst, 
media etc.) will have more optimists among their shareholders. Combining these results 
with Miller (1977) that prices are generally set by optimists it would imply that the high 
volatility stocks are generally priced at a premium relative to low volatility stocks, leading to 
lower future returns. 
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5.4. Equity Analysts’ Earnings Growth Forecast Effect on the anomaly 
Hsu, Kudoh and Yamada (2013) argue that, although sell side analysts have been shown to 
display over-optimism regarding firm earnings growth they are still presumably skilled 
professionals and rational economic agents. Sell-side research can still be valuable and can 
drive significant brokerage flows. Given that sell-side research can influence client 
investment activities, analysts are rated and rankings are made public. It is assumed that the 
analyst research rankings matter to the analysts’ employers. Theoretical and empirical 
research advocate the thesis that forecast accuracy and stock recommendations are linked 
with analyst promotions and analyst turnover (see Milkhail, Walther and Willis (1999)). 
Further theories and empirical evidence suggest that relationships with investment banking 
clients and prospects could influence analysts to bias their earnings growth forecasts 
upward and set the target stock prices higher than they otherwise would.  
In other words, a sell-side analyst could be faced with the situation where they produce 
favourable earnings growth forecasts without appearing biased and also providing 
profitable trading recommendations to clients. Hsu et al. (2013) argue that there is some 
equilibrium behaviour where all analysts inflate their reported growth estimates upward 
(e.g. by half a standard deviation) in order to be investment banking business friendly and to 
avoid the detection for inflating growth forecasts in certain situations. They argue that this 
behaviour would predict higher growth forecast bias for firms with higher earnings growth 
variability. As a consequence, this would also imply higher return volatility for these firms. 
They found, empirically, high volatility stocks to be associated with high analyst forecast 
bias. They argue that evidence suggests that investors do not fully appreciate the upward 
bias present in analyst forecasts; and so they overreact to analyst optimism in the short run. 
As such volatile stocks tend to be overvalued and experience low subsequent returns. This 
argument by Hsu et al. (2013) would help explain why the analyst growth forecast bias 
would explain part of the low volatility anomaly. 
In the South African setting analyst forecast earnings data is not easily obtainable on a 
historical basis. Figure 5.4.1 below shows the percentage of stocks in the ALSI 100, high 
volatility and low volatility portfolios for which 1 year forecast earnings data could be 
obtained over the back-test period (i.e. December 2003 – August 2014) on Bloomberg. 
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Figure 5.4.1: Available Forecast Earnings (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
Evidently from Figure 5.4.1 analyst forecast earnings data has been very limited in the South 
African setting. The analyst forecast earnings data has improved since 2012 such that of the 
stocks in the ALSI 100 (excluding Property stocks), consensus forecast earnings data was 
available for 76% of these as of August 2014. Of the stocks in the high and low volatility 
portfolios 82% and 67% had available analyst forecast earnings as of August 2014. 
Consistent with the findings in the earlier section it is evident from Figure 5.13 that the high 
volatility portfolio has consistently experienced more forecast earnings coverage than the 
low volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios. However, it is important to note that 
historically the forecast earnings data has been very limited in the South African market. So 
testing the analyst forecast earnings bias in the South African setting may not be 
straightforward given the lack of data. 
Hsu et al. (2013) define the analyst forecast bias as the difference in the forecast earnings 1 
year prior relative to the reported earnings 1 year later. 
The forecast earnings growth can be defined as follows: 
𝐹𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡,𝑡+1 =
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡,𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡
|𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡|
                                                          (25)  
where 𝐹𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡,𝑡+1 = forecast 𝐸𝑃𝑆 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ from time 𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑡 + 1 
𝐹𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡,𝑡+1 = forecast 𝐸𝑃𝑆 for time 𝑡 + 1 at time 𝑡  
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 = reported 𝐸𝑃𝑆 at time 𝑡  
The reported earnings growth is calculated as follows: 
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𝑅𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡+1 =
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡
|𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡|
                                                                 (26) 
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑅𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡+1 = reported 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ at time 𝑡 + 1 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 = reported 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 at time 𝑡 
Combining (25) and (26) above the analyst forecast growth bias is defined by Hsu et al. 
(2013) as follows: 
𝐹𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝐵 𝑡+1 = 𝐹𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡,𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡+1                                          
(27)  
𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐹𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝐵 𝑡+1 = earnings growth 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 at time 𝑡 + 1 
The aim is to test if there has been a higher forecast earnings growth bias for the high 
volatility stocks relative to the low volatility stocks in the South African setting. Given the 
lack of forecast earnings data, this will only be tested over the period June 2013 to August 
2014. Using the above derivation the forecast (1 year earlier) and reported earnings (1 year 
later) will be calculated for each stock in the market-cap weighted, high volatility and low 
volatility portfolios. Thereafter the average forecast and reported growth for these 
portfolios will be calculated. This will yield the average forecast and reported earnings 
growth per stock in the market-cap weighted, high and low volatility portfolios. From this, 
the forecast earnings growth bias will be calculated for these portfolios. This is shown in 
Figure 5.4.2 that follows: 
Figure 5.4.2: Growth Forecast Bias between Low and High Beta stocks 
 
Figure 5.4.2 is consistent with the findings of Hsu et al. (2013) that high volatility stocks are 
associated with high analyst forecast bias. As can be seen, the high volatility portfolio has 
had a higher forecast bias than the market-cap weighted portfolio. On the other hand, the 
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low volatility portfolio has had less analyst growth forecast bias than the market-cap 
weighted portfolio. Hsu et al. (2013) argue that evidence suggests that investors do not fully 
appreciate the upward bias in analyst growth forecasts for high volatility stocks; and so they 
overreact to analyst optimism in the short run.  They argue that this would cause the high 
volatility stocks to be overpriced leading to lower subsequent returns relative to low 
volatility portfolios. This helps explain the contribution of the upward growth bias present in 
analyst forecast earnings for high volatility portfolios to the low volatility anomaly in the 
South African market. 
It is important to note that this portfolio only has reliable data from November 2013. A 
serious criticism of this analysis could be that the analysis period is too short and so very 
little can be concluded from the analysis. However, it is encouraging to have found the 
results in the South African market to be consistent with international literature (see Hsu et 
al. (2013)). 
5.5. Investor overconfidence in growth forecasts for stocks with high 
earnings variability 
Yamada and Nagawatari (2010) argue that the price volatility of a stock should reflect a 
company’s earnings variability. They found stocks with high earnings variability to also 
possess high price volatility and vice versa. Hsu et al. (2013) also found this relationship to 
hold in both the developed and emerging markets. In addition, Yamada and Nagawatari 
(2010) also found stocks with higher earnings variability to have higher earnings growth 
forecast error than those with low earnings variability. Dichev and Tang (2010) also found 
that earnings volatility is negatively related to earnings predictability. This suggests that 
earnings growth of stocks with high earnings variability is harder to forecast than for stocks 
with low earnings variability. All else equal, this would suggest that the growth forecast of a 
stock with high earnings variability is more likely to be incorrect than a stock with low 
earnings variability. 
Figure 5.5.1 below depicts the rolling 5 year earnings variability of the low volatility, high 
volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios that were analysed in the South African 
setting. 
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Figure 5.5.1: Rolling 5 Year Earnings Volatility (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
Consistent with Hsu et al. (2013), in the South African setting the low volatility portfolio has 
consistently had lower earnings variability than both the high volatility and market-cap 
weighted portfolios. According to Dichev and Tang (2010) one would expect the forecast 
earnings growth of the low volatility portfolio to be more accurate than the high volatility 
and market-cap weighted portfolios all else equal. In section 4.4 (consistent with Hsu et al. 
(2013)) it was shown that the high volatility portfolio has a higher growth forecast bias than 
the low volatility portfolio. This combined with the poor earnings growth predictability for 
stocks with high earnings variability, support the notion that the reported earnings are more 
likely to miss forecasts for the high volatility portfolio than the low volatility portfolio. 
Yamada and Nagawatari (2010) found a positive relationship between earnings variability 
and price volatility in the Japanese stock market. They found, consistent with Hsu et al. 
(2013), high earnings variability portfolios to exhibit high forecast growth. In addition they 
found that investors tend to be overconfident in the forecast growth for companies with 
higher earnings variability. This is reflected in the low forward earnings yield of these 
companies relative to the low earnings variability counterparts.  
Figure 5.5.2 below depicts the forward earnings yield of the low volatility, high volatility and 
market-cap weighted portfolios in the South African setting. Unfortunately, due to the lack 
of forecast earnings data this is only reported over the period June 2013 to August 2014. 
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Figure 5.5.2: 1 Year Forward Earnings Yield 
 
In the South African setting, as shown in Figure 5.5.2, the low volatility portfolio has had a 
higher forward earnings yield than the high volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios. 
The finding in the South African setting has been consistent with both the studies of Hsu et 
al. (2013) and Yamada and Nagawatari (2010) who found that investors pay a higher 
premium for the high forecast growth in the stocks with high earnings variability which leads 
to low subsequent returns for these stocks. 
Baker et al. (2011) demonstrate that valuing stocks involves forecasting company financials 
into the future (e.g. revenue growth over the next 5 years etc.) which introduces forecast 
error. Investors are likely to disagree on their forecasts; in fact the disagreement is likely 
higher for the more uncertain outcomes (in this case forecasts for high variability stocks). To 
demonstrate their underlying estimates, investors will either buy or sell stocks. An extra 
assumption is necessary to connect the differences of opinion to the demand for high 
volatility stocks that pessimist act less aggressively than optimists, as noted by Baker et al. 
(2011). In other words, investors must be reluctant or unable to short stocks relative to 
buying them. Given the inability of both individual investors and institutional investors to 
short stocks, this assumption can be validated. As such stocks with a wide range of opinions 
will have more optimists among their shareholders and will thus be priced at a premium, 
leading to lower future returns.  
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5.6. Investor preference for lotteries  
Baker et al. (2011) use the following gambling example to show the investor preference for 
lotteries; which they argue is prevalent in the high volatility stocks: 
Example 5.6.1: Odds of Gamble with $5 expected payoff 
 Lose $100 Win $110 
Probabilities  50% 50% 
Expected Payoff $5 
 
Baker et al. (2011) argue that most people would not take this gamble despite the positive 
expected payoff of $5. They argue that the possibility of losing $100 while trying to win $110 
is enough to deter participation. 
However, they notice a change in the behaviour if the probabilities and payoffs are shifted 
although expected payoff remains the same as shown below: 
Example 5.6.2: Odds of Gamble with $5 expected payoff 
 Lose $1 Win $5000 
Probabilities  99.88% 0.12% 
Expected Payoff $5 
 
They argue that most people take the second gamble, although the expected payoff is the 
same as that in example 5.6.1. Baker et al. (2011) argue that this behaviour is more about 
positive skewness; where large positive payoffs are more likely than large negative ones 
than it is about volatility. Yamada and Nagawatari (2010) argue that there are investors who 
accept low expected returns intentionally in exchange for extremely high returns that are 
rarely seen. To demonstrate this they focus on the skewness of the low volatility vs. high 
volatility stocks. Their argument is that high volatility stocks possess positive skewness 
relative to low volatility stocks. This implies that high volatility stock returns are lower than 
the mean with a high probability. However, there is a small probability that high volatility 
stocks can yield exceptionally high returns. Investor demand for this lottery-like payoff leads 
to high demand for high volatility stocks. This in turn results in lower future returns.  
Table 5.6.1 below depicts the skewness of the low volatility, high volatility and market-cap 
weighted portfolios in the South African setting. 
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Table 5.6.1 Skewness of the portfolio returns (December 2003 – August 2014) 
 
It is evident from Table 5.6.1 that the low volatility, high volatility and market-cap weighted 
portfolios all have positive skewness in their returns. Of these, the market-cap weighted 
portfolio has the highest positive skewness. The high volatility portfolio exhibits more 
positive skewness than the low volatility portfolio. The positive skewness inherent in the 
high volatility portfolio would imply that this portfolio is more likely to deliver returns below 
the mean; however, there is a small probability that it can deliver abnormal returns. This is 
consistent with the findings about manager compensation as noted by Baker and Haugen 
(2012). An investment manager is more likely to earn a performance bonus for returns 
above a certain threshold if they are invested in high volatility stocks than low volatility 
stocks. However, they are also more likely to deliver below-average returns. 
 
  
Period
Low Vol SI Model 
ex Property
High Vol SI Model 
ex Property
Market Cap Wt Ex 
Property
3 Months -0.19 -0.16 0.05
6 Months -0.02 0.06 0.19
12 Months 0.17 0.28 0.36
36 Months 0.10 0.16 0.22
60 Months 0.09 0.11 0.16
84 Months 0.08 0.09 0.12
93 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Back-testing the low volatility anomaly in the South African market 
In this thesis the low volatility anomaly has been found to be prevalent in the South African 
market; where low volatility portfolios have outperformed high volatility portfolios at a 
materially lower risk out-of-period. In addition the low volatility portfolios were found to 
possess statistically significant positive alphas relative to the high volatility portfolio out-of-
period. These findings in the South African market are consistent with international studies 
(see Baker and Haugen (2012), Hsu et al. (2013), Baker et al. (2014) among others).  
In the South African market the following sector biases within the portfolios were found to 
explain a statistically significant proportion of the low volatility outperformance: 
 Listed Property 
o The low volatility portfolio was materially overweight Listed Property sector 
relative to the high volatility portfolio. 
 FINDI vs. RESI  
o The low volatility portfolio was materially overweight FINDI and underweight 
RESI shares. 
 
The above-mentioned sector exposures would have benefitted the low volatility portfolio, 
as it had overweight positions in the sectors that outperformed and underweight positions 
in the sectors that underperformed. As such it could be argued that the observed 
outperformance may have been as a result of a sector allocation decision rather than a low 
volatility anomaly. Thus, the following portfolio construction variations were considered to 
help gauge if the outperformance observed can solely be attributed to sector effect in the 
South African market: 
 A sector neutral portfolio was constructed to investigate if the observed 
outperformance could have been as a result of a sector effect.  
o The sector neutral low volatility portfolio outperformed the high volatility 
portfolio at a lower risk out-of-period and produced a statistically significant 
positive alpha relative to this portfolio.  
o Thus, it was concluded that the low volatility effect in the South African 
market exists at the stock selection level within sectors, consistent with 
Baker et al. (2014). 
 Portfolios were constructed excluding Listed Property and Resources stocks from 
the investable universe. 
o The low volatility portfolios outperformed the high volatility portfolios and 
produced statistically significant positive alphas out-of-period relative to the 
high volatility portfolios. 
o It was then concluded that the low volatility effect in the South African 
market is prevalent and statistically significant within sectors; as opposed to 
it being solely a sector effect. 
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In the South African market the low volatility portfolios were found to have considerably 
lower drawdowns than the high volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios. As a result 
the required positive return burden to break-even (after suffering the losses) was found to 
be materially smaller for the low volatility portfolios. Consequently, the low volatility 
portfolios took a much shorter time to recover from losses (i.e. on average 1 year shorter) 
than the high volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios. As such, the above explanation 
was found to be prevalent in the South African market and consistent with Blitz and van 
Vliet (2014). 
It was further concluded that the imposition of sector constraints (e.g. sector neutrality) 
considerably worsened the risk and drawdown characteristics of the low volatility portfolios. 
In addition the imposition of sector constraints was also found to produce materially 
different portfolios as shown by the high active share relative to the low volatility portfolios 
without sector constraints. It was argued that this may have a significant impact on the 
interpretation of the low volatility anomaly post the imposition of sector constraints. It was 
then argued that the above findings may help explain why some of the sector-constrained 
low volatility portfolios underperformed the market-cap weighted portfolio. 
 
Understanding the low volatility anomaly in the South African market 
After concluding that the low volatility effect is prevalent and statistically significant within 
sectors in the South African market, an analysis was performed to help with the 
understanding of the rationale for the outperformance of these portfolios. In particular the 
following theoretical explanations were back-tested in the South African market: 
1. Benchmarking as a limit to arbitrage (Baker et al. (2011))  
Baker et al. (2011) argue that investment managers are typically mandated relative to 
market-cap weighted benchmarks. From a portfolio construction perspective, Baker et al. 
(2011) show that an investment manager who aims to increase their ex-ante information 
ratio (relative to the market-cap weighted benchmark) would demand a higher expected 
alpha from a low beta stock than a high beta stock. It is argued that this would create excess 
demand for high volatility stocks. Consequently this would lead to high volatility stocks 
being priced at a premium relative to low volatility stocks, leading to lower subsequent 
returns. While this explanation was not explicitly back-tested in the South African setting it 
is closely linked with the explanation regarding manager compensation. 
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2. Manager Compensation and Agency issues between investment managers 
and their clients (Baker and Haugen (2012))  
Baker and Haugen (2012) and Baker et al. (2011) argue that the payoff of an investment 
manager who is compensated with a performance fee (above a certain threshold) resembles 
a call option. They argue that the investment manager would maximise the probability of 
achieving the performance fee if they were invested in high volatility stocks rather than low 
volatility stocks. This argument was back-tested in the South African market and it was 
concluded that a manager who is mandated relative to the market-cap weighted benchmark 
would be taking on unwanted relative risk by investing in the low beta stocks, decreasing 
their probability of earning a performance fee. On the contrary the manager would be 
incentivised to avoid low beta stocks and rather invest in high beta stocks to minimise the 
chances of extreme underperformance on their part. This would induce excess demand for 
high beta stocks leading them to be overpriced (relative to low beta stocks), implying lower 
subsequent returns for these stocks. This finding in the South African market is consistent 
with the international studies of Baker and Haugen (2012) and Baker et al. (2011). 
3. Agency issues amongst investment professionals (Baker and Ha ugen 
(2012)) 
Baker and Haugen (2012) argue that high volatility stocks receive more analyst coverage 
than low volatility stocks, implying that they are more likely to be included in the model 
portfolio than low volatility stocks. This argument was back-tested in the South African 
market and high volatility stocks were found to have consistently had more analyst coverage 
than low volatility stocks, consistent with Baker and Haugen (2012). In addition the higher 
analyst coverage for high volatility stocks was found to have been accompanied by a higher 
percentage of “Buy” recommendations relative to low volatility stocks. These findings in the 
South African market strongly support the argument put forth by Baker and Haugen (2012) 
that high volatility stocks are more likely to be included in the model portfolio than low 
volatility stocks. This would imply excess demand for high volatility stocks, making them to 
be priced at a premium relative to low volatility stocks and leading to lower future returns. 
4. Analysts’ Earnings Growth Forecast Bias (Hsu, et al. (2013)) 
Hsu et al. (2013) found high volatility stocks to be associated with high analyst forecast bias. 
They argue that evidence suggests that investors do not fully appreciate the upward bias in 
analyst growth forecasts for high volatility stocks; and so they overreact to analyst optimism 
in the short run. Hsu et al. (2013) argue that this leads to high volatility stocks being 
overpriced resulting in lower subsequent returns relative to low volatility stocks. In the 
South African market high volatility stocks were found to have had a consistently higher 
analyst forecast growth bias than both the low volatility and market-cap weighted 
portfolios, consistent with Hsu et al. (2013). While this does shed some light on the low 
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volatility anomaly in the South African market, it is important to note that reliable analyst 
forecast earnings data in this market is only available from November 2013 in Bloomberg. A 
serious criticism of this analysis could be that the analysis period is too short and so very 
little can be concluded from the analysis. However, it is encouraging to have found the 
results in the South African market to be consistent with international literature. 
 
5. Investor overconfidence in growth forecasts for st ocks with high 
earnings variability (Yamada and Nagawatari (2010), Hsu et al. (2013) 
and Dichev and Tang (2010)) 
Yamada and Nagawatari (2010) argue that the price volatility of a stock should reflect a 
company’s earnings variability. They found stocks with high earnings variability to also 
possess high price volatility and vice versa consistent with Hsu et al. (2013). Yamada and 
Nagawatari (2010) also found stocks with higher earnings variability to have higher earnings 
growth forecast error than those with low earnings variability. Dichev and Tang (2010) also 
found that earnings volatility is negatively related to earnings predictability. All else equal, 
this would suggest that the growth forecast of a stock with high earnings variability is more 
likely to be incorrect than a stock with low earnings variability. In the South African market 
the low volatility portfolio was found to have consistently had lower earnings variability 
than both the high volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios. According to Dichev and 
Tang (2010) one would expect the forecast earnings growth of the low volatility portfolio to 
be more accurate than the high volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios all else equal. 
Yamada and Nagawatari (2010) found that investors tend to be overconfident in the 
forecast growth for companies with higher earnings variability. This is reflected in the low 
forward earnings yield of these companies relative to the companies with low earnings 
variability. In the South African market the high volatility portfolio was found to have had a 
lower forward earnings yield than the low volatility and market-cap weighted portfolios. The 
finding in the South African setting is consistent with both the studies of Hsu et al. (2013) 
and Yamada and Nagawatari (2010) who found that investors pay a higher premium for the 
high forecast growth in the stocks with high earnings variability which leads to low 
subsequent returns for these stocks. 
6. Investor Preference for lotteries (Baker et al. (2011)  
Baker et al. (2011) argue that the low volatility anomaly can be attributed to behavioural 
biases regarding positive skewness; where large positive payoffs are more likely than large 
negative ones than it is about volatility. Yamada and Nagawatari (2010) argue that there are 
investors who accept low expected returns intentionally in exchange for extremely high 
returns that are rarely seen. Yamada and Nagawatari (2010) further argue that high 
volatility stocks possess positive skewness relative to low volatility stocks. This implies that 
high volatility stock returns are lower than the mean with a high probability. However, there 
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is a small probability that high volatility stocks can yield exceptionally high returns. In the 
South African market the high volatility portfolio was found to exhibit more positive 
skewness than the low volatility portfolio, consistent with Baker et al. (2011) and Yamada 
and Nagawatari (2010). The positive skewness inherent in the high volatility portfolio would 
imply that this portfolio is more likely to deliver returns below the mean; however, there is a 
small probability that it can deliver abnormally high returns. Yamada and Nagawatari (2010) 
argue that investor demand for this lottery-like payoff leads to excess demand for high 
volatility stocks, resulting in lower future returns. The above finding in the South African 
market supports this argument by Yamada and Nagawatari (2010). 
In conclusion the low volatility anomaly was found to be prevalent in the South African 
market. The findings in international literature regarding the potential causes of the 
anomaly were also found to be prevalent in the South African market. Given the causes and 
market biases (e.g. analyst forecast biases etc.) that have been covered in this thesis 
continue into the future, the low volatility anomaly can be expected to continue in the 
South African equity market. 
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